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After a debtor files a bankruptcy petition, creditors may seek to
collect their claims from individuals who are liable along with the
debtor. Relatives or friends may have guaranteed some of the
debtor's obligations. Principals may have guaranteed some of a cor-
poration's obligations1 or may be liable to the creditors of the cor-
poration on other grounds. 2 General partners are liable to
t Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. I thank David Carlson, Neil Cohen,
Maryellen Fullerton, Michael Gerber, and Arthur Pinto for their helpful comments.
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Stipend Program, and I thank Dean David Trager for his support.
1 See, e.g., In re Keyco, Inc., 49 Bankr. 507 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1985); In re Otero
Mills, Inc., 21 Bankr. 777 (Bankr. D.N.M.), aff'd, 25 Bankr. 1018 (D.N.M. 1982).
2 The most common "other" ground bases personal liability on I.R.C. § 6672
(1982). This section addresses the liability of persons responsible for collecting and
paying over withholding and other "trust fund" taxes. E.g., Slodov v. United States, 436
U.S. 238 (1978). Personal liability can also arise under other circumstances. See, e.g., In
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partnership creditors. 3 In addition, the debtor's insurers may be lia-
ble in a direct action for some of the debtor's obligations. 4
The Bankruptcy Code protects the Chapter 11 debtor from di-
rect actions by creditors through the automatic stay in section 362. 5
The filing of a bankruptcy petition stays virtually all actions to col-
lect pre-petition claims from the debtor and all efforts to pressure a
re Ozark Restaurant Equip. Co., 816 F.2d 1222 (8th Cir.) ("alter ego" action), cert. denied
sub nom. Jacoway v. Anderson, 108 S. Ct. 147 (1987); In re S.I. Acquisition, Inc., 817 F.2d
1142 (5th Cir. 1987) ("piercing the corporate veil"); Cumberland Oil Corp. v. Thropp,
791 F.2d 1037 (2d Cir.) (fraud action), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 436 (1986); Delgado Oil
Co. v. Torres, 785 F.2d 857 (10th Cir. 1986) (breach of fiduciary obligation); In reJohns-
Manville Corp., 26 Bankr. 420 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (violations of securities laws),
aff'd, 40 Bankr. 219 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd in part on other grounds, 41 Bankr. 926 (S.D.N.Y.
1984). For some additional "other" grounds, see infra note 19.
3 Bankruptcy Code § 723, 11 U.S.C. § 723 (1982) [hereinafter Bankruptcy Code];
UNIF. PARTNERSHiP ACT § 15, 6 U.L.A. 174 (1914).
A prefatory note on taxonomy may aid the reader. Congress enacted the current
Bankruptcy Code in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat.
2549 (1978). Congress later substantially amended the Bankruptcy Code with the Bank-
ruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat.
333 (1984), and again with the Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family
Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, 100 Stat. 3088 (1986). The Bank-
ruptcy Code is codified at title 11 of the United States Code. Bankruptcy.Code citations
followed by a parenthetical reference to "West" indicate U.S.C.A.
4 See, e.g.. In reJohns-Manville Corp., 40 Bankr. 219 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), rev'd in part
on other grounds, 41 Bankr. 926 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
5 Bankruptcy Code § 362 (West 1979 & Supp. 1987). Section 362 states:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed
under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title, or an application filed under
section 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15
U.S.C. 78eee(a)(3)), operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of-
(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or
employment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other action or
proceeding against the debtor that was or could have been commenced
before the commencement of the case under this title, or to recover a
claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case
under this title;
(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the
estate, of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the case
under this title;
(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of
property from the estate or to exercise control over property of the es-
tate;
(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of
the estate;
(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the
debtor any lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose
before the commencement of the case under this title;
(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor
that arose before the commencement of the case under this tide;
(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the
commencement of the case under this title against any claim against the
debtor; and
(8) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the
United States Tax Court concerning the debtor.
(b) The filing of a petition under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title, or
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debtor into payment. As Congress made clear, the stay is "one of
of an application under section 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protec-
tion Act of 1970 (15 U.S.C. 78eee(a)(3)), does not operate as a stay-
(1) under subsection (a) of this section, of the commencement or
continuation of a criminal action or proceeding against the debtor;
(2) under subsection (a) of this section, of the collection of ali-
mony, maintenance, or support from property that is not property of the
estate;
(3) under subsection (a) of this section, of any act to perfect an in-
terest in property to the extent that the trustee's rights and powers are
subject to such perfection under section 546(b) of this title or to the ex-
tent that such act is accomplished within the period provided under sec-
tion 547(e)(2)(A) of this title;
(4) under subsection (a)(1) of this section, of the commencement
or continuation of an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to
enforce such governmental unit's police or regulatory power;
(5) under subsection (a) (2) of this section, of the enforcement of a
judgment, other than a money judgment, obtained in an action or pro-
ceeding by a governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit's po-
lice or regulatory power;
(6) under subsection (a) of this section, of the setoff by a commod-
ity broker, forward contract merchant, stockbroker, financial institutions,
or securities clearing agency of any mutual debt and claim under or in
connection with commodity contracts, as defined in section 761(4) of this
title, forward contracts, or securities contracts, as defined in section
741(7) of this title, that constitutes the setoff of a claim against the debtor
for a margin payment, as defined in section 741(5) or 761(15) of this title,
or settlement payment, as defined in section 741(8) of this title, arising
out of commodity contracts, forward contracts, or securities contracts
against cash, securities, or other property held by or due from such com-
modity broker, forward contract merchant, stockbroker, financial institu-
tions, or securities clearing agency to margin, guarantee, secure, or settle
commodity contracts, forward contracts, or securities contracts;
(7) under subsection (a) of this section, of the setoff by a repo par-
ticipant, of any mutual debt and claim under or in connection with repur-
chase agreements that constitutes the setoff of a claim against the debtor
for a margin payment, as defined in section 741(5) or 761(15) of this title,
or settlement payment, as defined in section 741(8) of this title, arising
out of repurchase agreements against cash, securities, or other property
held by or due from such repo participant to margin, guarantee, secure
or settle repurchase agreements;
(8) under subsection (a) of this section, of the commencement of
any action by the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development to fore-
close a mortgage or deed of trust in any case in which the mortgage or
deed of trust held by the Secretary is insured or was formerly insured
under the National Housing Act and covers property, or combinations of
property, consisting of five more [sic] living units;
(9) under subsection (a) of this section, of the issuance to the
debtor by a governmental unit of a notice of tax deficiency;
(10) under subsection (a) of this section, of any act by a lessor to
the debtor under a lease of nonresidential real property that has termi-
nated by the expiration of the stated term of the lease before the com-
mencement of or during a case under this title to obtain possession of
such property; or [sic)
(11) under subsection (a) of this section, of the presentment of a
negotiable instrument and the giving of notice of and protesting dis-
honor of such an instrument;
(12) under subsection (a) of this section, after the date which is 90
days after the filing of such petition, of the commencement or continua-
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the fundamental debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy
tion, and conclusion to the entry of final judgment, of an action which
involves a debtor subject to reorganization pursuant to chapter 11 of this
title and which was brought by the Secretary of Transportation under the
Ship Mortgage Act, 1920 (46 App. U.S.C. 911 et seq.) (including distribu-
tion of any proceeds of sale) to foreclose a preferred ship or fleet mort-
gage, or a security interest in or relating to a vessel or vessel under
construction, held by the Secretary of Transportation under section 207
or title XI of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936 (46 App. U.S.C. 1117 and
1271 et seq., respectively), or under applicable State law; or
(13) under subsection (a) of this section, after the date which is 90
days after the filing of such petition, of the commencement or continua-
tion, and conclusion to the entry of final judgment, of an action which
involves a debtor subject to reorganization pursuant to chapter 11 of this
title and which was brought by the Secretary of Commerce under the
Ship Mortgage Act, 1920 (46 App. U.S.C. 911 et seq.) (including distribu-
tion of any proceeds of sale) to foreclose a preferred ship or fleet mort-
gage in a vessel or a mortgage, deed of trust, or other security interest in
a fishing facility held by the Secretary of Commerce under section 207 or
title XI of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936 (46 App. U.S.C. 1117 and 1271
et seq. respectively).
The provisions of paragraphs (12) and (13) of this subsection shall apply
with respect to such petition filed on or before December 31, 1989.
(c) Except as provided in subsections (d), (e), and (f) of this section-
(1) the stay of an act against property of the estate under subsec-
tion (a) of this section continues until such property is no longer property
of the estate; and
(2) the stay of any other act under subsection (a) of this section
continues until the earliest of-
(A) the time the case is closed;
(B) the time the case is dismissed; or
(C) if the case is a case under chapter 7 of this title concerning
an individual or a case under chapter 9, 11, 12, or 13 of this title, the
time a discharge is granted or denied.
(d) On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the
court shall grant relief from the stay provided under subsection (a) of this
section, such as by terminating, annulling, modifying, or conditioning
such stay-
(1) for cause, including the lack of adequate protection of an inter-
est in property of such party in interest; or
(2) with respect to a stay of an act against property under subsec-
tion (a) of this section, if-
(A) the debtor does not have an equity in such property; and
(B) such property is not necessary to an effective
reorganization.
(e) Thirty days after a request under subsection (d) of this section for
relief from the stay of any act against property of the estate under subsec-
tion (a) of this section, such stay is terminated with respect to the party in
interest making such request, unless the court, after notice and hearing,
orders such stay continued in effect pending the conclusion of, or as a
result of, a final hearing and determination under subsection (d) of this
section. A hearing under this subsection may be a preliminary hearing,
or may be consolidated with the final hearing under subsection (d) of this
section. The court shall order such stay continued in effect pending the
conclusion of the final hearing under subsection (d) of this section if
there is a reasonable likelihood that the party opposing relief from such
stay will prevail at the conclusion of such final hearing. If the hearing
under this subsection is a preliminary hearing, then such final hearing
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laws."'6 The automatic stay gives the debtor "a breathing spell from
his creditors. It stops all collection efforts, all harassment, and all
foreclosure actions. It permits the debtor to attempt a repayment or
reorganization plan, or simply to be relieved of the financial pres-
sures that drove him into bankruptcy."'7 The stay also protects cred-
itors from each other, preventing a "race of diligence by creditors
for the debtor's assets" 8 and encouraging "an orderly liquidation
procedure under which all creditors are treated equally." 9
Although the section 362 automatic stay protects the debtor
and its creditors, it does not appear to offer the same protection to
co-debtors.' 0 By its terms, the stay in section 362 applies only to
actions against the debtor." Thus, unless a court enjoins the ac-
tion, creditors may generally proceed against co-debtors without in-
terference. 12 Nevertheless, some co-debtors have sought to prevent
actions against them when debtors have sought to reorganize under
shall be commenced not later than thirty days after the conclusion of such
preliminary hearing.
(0 Upon request of a party in interest, the court with or without a hear-
ing, shall grant such relief from the stay provided under subsection (a) of
this section as is necessary to prevent irreparable damage to the interest
of an entity in property, if such interest will suffer such damage before
there is an opportunity for notice and a hearing under subsection (d) or
(e) of this section.
(g) In any hearing under subsection (d) or (e) of this section concerning
relief from the stay of any act under subsection (a) of this section-
(1) the party requesting such relief has the burden of proof on the
issue of the debtor's equity in property; and
(2) the party opposing such relief has the burden of proof on all
other issues.
(h) An individual injured by any willful violation of a stay provided by
this section shall recover actual damages, including costs and attorneys'
fees, and, in appropriate circumstances, may recover punitive damages.
Id.
6 H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 340 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6296. The Senate Report contains identical language. S.
REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 54, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 5787, 5840.
7 H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 6, at 340, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 6296-97.
8 Id., reinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 6297.
9 Id.
10 But see A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994 (4th Cir.) (applying section 362
stay to actions against third parties), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 251 (1986).
11 E.g., In reJohns-Manville Corp., 26 Bankr. 405 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (denying
extension of automatic stay to cover co-debtors), aff'd, 40 Bankr. 219 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); In
re Johns-Manville Corp., 26 Bankr. 420 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 40 Bankr. 219
(S.D.N.Y.), rev'd in part on other grounds, 41 Bankr. 926 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
12 One exception to this proposition is an action that concerns property of the es-
tate. If a nondebtor is in possession of property of the estate, or if the action itself is
property of the estate, enabling the debtor or trustee to bring it on behalf of creditors,
the action may be stayed by section 362. Bankruptcy Code section 362(a)(3) (West
Supp. 1987). See, e.g., In re S.I. Acquisition, Inc., 817 F.2d 1142 (5th Cir. 1987); A.H.
Robins v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 251 (1986).
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Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. In seeking to stay these ac-
tions, co-debtors have echoed many of the same justifications that
underlie the section 362 automatic stay. Principals of debtor corpo-
rations have maintained that actions against them would interfere
with the debtors' reorganizations because the actions would divert
their attention from the debtors' businesses or prevent them from
infusing capital into the debtors. Partners of debtor partnerships
have made similar claims. Insurers have justified the issuance of
stays because they will have only limited funds to distribute among
all claimants.
Although there are limited co-debtor stays in Chapters 12 and
13,13 Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code does not contain a co-
debtor stay provision. The absence of an explicit co-debtor stay in
Chapter 11, however, has not prevented some courts from staying
actions against co-debtors.' 4 These courts have found the authority
to issue co-debtor stays in their general equitable power under sec-
tion 105, which empowers the court' 5 to "issue any order.., that is
necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title."'
16
13 Bankruptcy Code §§ 1201, 1301 (West Supp. 1987).
14 See, e.g., In re Monroe Well Serv., 67 Bankr. 746 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986); In re
Rustic Mfg., 55 Bankr. 25 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1985); In re Kasual Kreation, Inc., 54 Bankr.
915 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985); In re Arrow Huss, Inc., 51 Bankr. 853 (Bankr. D. Utah
1985); In reJohns-Manville Corp., 26 Bankr. 420 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983), aft'd, 40 Bankr.
219 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd in part on other grounds, 41 Bankr. 926 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); In re Otero
Mills, Inc., 21 Bankr. 777 (Bankr. D.N.M.), aft'd, 25 Bankr. 1018 (D.N.M. 1982).
15 The Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-353, 98 Stat. 333, deleted the references to "bankruptcy" court and granted the
power to "[t]he court." By deleting the word "bankruptcy," Congress intended to con-
form to the jurisdictional amendments that placed bankruptcy jurisdiction in the district
court, subject to reference to the bankruptcy court. Congress did not intend to deprive
bankruptcy courts of their traditional equity power; rather, Congress merely indicated
that the district court exercising bankruptcy jurisdiction also has equity power. 2 L.
KING, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 105.01, at 105-2 (15th ed. 1986) [hereinafter COLLIER
ON BANKRUPTCY (15th ed.)]. This reasoning is supported by section 105(c), which specif-
ically refers to "district court," indicating that when Congress meant district court it
knew how to say that. The deletion of "bankruptcy," suggests therefore, that Congress
intended the section 105 power to be available to bankruptcy courts as well as to district
courts which, under the 1984 amendments, have jurisdiction over bankruptcy matters.
In 1986 Congress further amended section 105 to permit the court to act sua sponte.
Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-554, § 203, 100 Stat. 3088, 3097.
16 Bankruptcy Code § 105 (West Supp. 1987). The full text of section 105 states:
(a) The court may issue any order, process, orjudgment that is nec-
essary or appropriate to carry out the provision of this title. No provision
of this title providing for the raising of an issue by a party in interest shall
be construed to preclude the court from, sua sponte, taking any action or
making any determination necessary or appropriate to enforce or imple-
ment court orders or rules, or to prevent an abuse of process.
(b) Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, a court may not
appoint a receiver in a case under this title.
(c) The ability of any district judge or other officer or employee of a
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Many courts, however, have refused to issue co-debtor stays, either
because the facts did not seem to justify such an extraordinary rem-
edy17 or because they believed that the Bankruptcy Code does not
authorize such a stay in Chapter 11.18
However, few courts have carefully analyzed the interests in-
volved or attempted to articulate and apply meaningful standards to
co-debtor stay requests. Indeed, few courts have attempted even to
offer a principled basis for such an extraordinary remedy. Conse-
quently, reaction to co-debtor stay requests remains unpredictable
at best, and the lack of a clear basis for the issuance of co-debtor
stays has made the search for meaningful standards difficult.
In Section I of this article I demonstrate that section 105 of the
Bankruptcy Code does indeed authorize a co-debtor stay in Chapter
11. I next identify, in Section II, the most significant bankruptcy
and nonbankruptcy interests that a co-debtor stay implicates, and
present a general framework for balancing these often competing
interests, allocating burdens among the parties, and determining
the proper scope of a stay. The balance of this article, Sections
III(A)-(D), applies this general framework of analysis to four situa-
tions in which co-debtor stay issues have arisen: debt guarantees by
principals of a debtor; liability of general partners for debts of the
partnership; liability of "responsible persons" for "trust fund" taxes
owed by a debtor; and liability of insurers of a debtor. 19
district court to exercise any of the authority or responsibilities conferred
upon the court under this title shall be determined by reference to the
provisions relating to such judge, officer, or employee set forth in title 28.
This subsection shall not be interpreted to exclude bankruptcy judges
and other officers or employees appointed pursuant to chapter 6 of title
28 from its operation.
Id.
17 See, e.g., In re Philadelphia Gold Corp., 56 Bankr. 87 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1985); In re
Elec. Theatre Restaurants Corp., 53 Bankr. 458 (N.D. Ohio 1985); In re Brookfield Ten-
nis, Inc., 29 Bankr. 1 (E.D. Wis. 1982).
18 See, e.g., In re Aboussie Bros. Constr. Co., 8 Bankr. 302 (E.D. Mo. 1981); In re
Venture Properties, 37 Bankr. 175 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1984). See also, Austin v. Unarco In-
dus., 705 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.) (rejecting applicability of Bankruptcy Code section 362 to co-
defendants and alluding to section 1301 as evidence of legislature's ability explicitly to
authorize co-debtor stay when so intended), cert. dismissed, 463 U.S. 1247 (1983).
19 Co-debtor stay requests typically arise in these situations. Other situations may
raise co-debtor stay or analogous issues. For example, a section 362 stay may implicate
actions against co-defendants. E.g., A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994 (4th Cir.)
(debtor A.H. Robins obtained stay of actions against nonbankrupt co-defendants in
products liability action after plaintiffs sought to sever action against A.H. Robins and
proceed against co-defendants), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 251 (1986); In reJohns-Manville
Corp., 26 Bankr. 405 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (refusing to extend stay to actions against
nonbankrupt co-defendants), aff'd, 40 Bankr. 219 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). See also In re S.I. Ac-
quisition, Inc., 817 F.2d 1142 (5th Cir. 1987) (staying "alter ego" action against non-
debtors); In re Ozark Restaurant Equip. Co., 816 F.2d 1222 (8th Cir.) (refusing to stay
"alter ego" action), cert. denied sub nom. Jacoway v. Anderson, 108 S. Ct. 147 (1987);
Mitchell Excavators, Inc. v. Mitchell, 734 F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1984) (stockholders' deriva-
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AUTHORITY TO ISSUE CO-DEBTOR STAYS
A. Co-Debtor Stays Under the Prior Bankruptcy Act
Section 2(a)(15) of the current Bankruptcy Code's predecessor,
the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, empowered the bankruptcy court to
"make such orders, issue such process, and enter such judgments, in
addition to those specifically provided for as may be necessary for
the enforcement of the provisions of this Act."' 20 Through this pro-
vision, Congress expressly affirmed the bankruptcy court's inherent
power as a court of equity. 21 The test that developed for applying
the broad authorization of section 2(a)(15) to nonbankruptcy ac-
tions was whether "the proceeding in the non-bankruptcy court in-
terferes with the possession or custody of the bankruptcy court, or
unduly impedes or embarrasses the court in its administration
under the Act."
2 2
Bankruptcy courts generally used their section 2(a) (15) power
to protect property of the estate and to aid in estate administration.
They rarely enjoined actions against nonbankrupt co-debtors, with
most courts expressing some doubt about their jurisdiction to en-
join actions that involved neither the debtor nor its property. 23
In part, this doubt related to the limited jurisdiction of the
bankruptcy court under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. The court's
tive action stayed); Gold v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 723 F.2d 1068 (3d Cir. 1983)
(refusing to stay actions against nonbankrupt co-defendants); Lynch v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp., 710 F.2d 1194 (6th Cir. 1983) (same); Wedgeworth v. Fibreboard Corp.,
706 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1983) (vacated in part on reh'g, 706 F.2d 541, 548) (same). Prin-
cipals may also expose themselves to criminal liability for actions taken on behalf of a
debtor. This in turn raises issues similar to those in a direct creditor action. E.g., In re
Dettler Farms, 58 Bankr. 404 (D.S.D. 1986) (barring creditor from using criminal prose-
cution to obtain preference); In re Heart of the City, 52 Bankr. 108 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
1985) (refusing to enjoin state criminal action because criminal proceeding not being
used to obtain payment of debt).
20 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 2(a)(15), 30 Stat. 544, 546 (1898) (formerly
codified at 11 U.S.C. § 11 (1976)), repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-598, § 401(a), 92 Stat. 2549, 2682.
21 1J. MOORE & L. KING, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 2.61, at 323 (14th ed. 1974)
[hereinafter COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY (14th ed.)].
22 Id. at 327.
23 See, e.g., In re Magnus Harmonica Corp., 233 F.2d 803 (3d Cir. 1956); McGinnis
Lumber Co. v. Belser, 385 F. Supp. 390 (D.S.C. 1974). See also In re Adolf Gobel, Inc.,
80 F.2d 849 (2d Cir. 1936) (court has no jurisdiction to enjoin action against subsidiary);
In re Beck Indus., 338 F. Supp. 1369 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (same); In re Patten Paper Co., 86
F.2d 761 (7th Cir. 1936) (same result in action against stockholder of bankrupt). But see
In re Equity Funding Corp. of Am., 396 F. Supp. 1266 (C.D. Cal. 1975) (court has inher-
ent jurisdiction under section 2(a)(15) to enjoin actions against debtor's subsidiaries
where actions would interfere with court's valuation of debtor and determination of
whether debtor's plan is fair, equitable and feasible, and actions would delay rteorganiza-
tion and cause loss of value of subsidiary as going concern), af'd, 519 F.2d 1274 (9th
Cir. 1975); In re Old Orchard Inv. Co., 31 Bankr. 599 (W.D. Mich. 1983).
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summary jurisdiction encompassed only actions involving property
in the actual or constructive possession of the court, and the admin-
istration of the estate.24 Even the district court's plenary jurisdic-
tion extended only to other actions involving the bankrupt or
property of the estate.25 Because actions against co-debtors only in-
directly affected the bankrupt, courts found it difficult to justify an
extension of their section 2(a)(15) power to those actions.
B. Section 105 of the Current Bankruptcy Code
Section 105 of the Bankruptcy Code is the successor to section
2(a)(15) of the prior Act. It empowers the court to "issue any order,
process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out
the provisions of this title." 26 Under this provision, courts have
found the authority to grant co-debtor stays in appropriate cases. 27
Interestingly, however, few courts have explicitly reconciled their
broader construction of section 105 with the pre-Code cases that
construed a similarly worded statute as barring co-debtor stays.
28
24 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 2, 30 Stat. 544, 545 (1898) (formerly codified
at 11 U.S.C. § 11 (1976)), repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
598, § 401 (a), 92 Stat. 2549, 2682 (1978) See 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPrcY (14th ed.), supra
note 21, at 2.09.
25 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 23, 30 Stat. 544, 552-53 (1898) (formerly
codified at 11 U.S.C. § 46 (1976)), repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-598, § 401(a), 92 Stat. 2549, 2682 (1978).
26 Bankruptcy Code'§ 105 (West Supp. 1987).
Before the 1984 amendments, 28 U.S.C. § 1481 (1982) (repealed 1984) provided
the bankruptcy courts with the general powers of a court of equity, law, and admiralty.
Section 113 of the Bankruptcy Amendments and FederalJudgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333, 343, rendered ineffective the statutory provision that had cre-
ated 28 U.S.C. § 1481 (Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 241, 92
Stat. 2549, 2671). However, section 121(a) of the 1984 Act also provided that the
amendments made in 1978 are effective as of July 10, 1984, including, apparently, the
addition of 28 U.S.C. § 1481. Notwithstanding the conflicting provisions, Congress
probably intended to repeal 28 U.S.C. § 1481. See, 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY (15th
ed.), supra note 15, 105.02, at 105-3.
Similarly, the 1978 Act amended 28 U.S.C. § 451 to include bankruptcy courts in
the term "court of the United States," giving them the authority of the All Writs Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1651 (1982). Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 213, 92
Stat. 2549, 2661 (1978). As with section 1481, the 1984 Act probably repealed this
section.
Thus, the sole remaining authority for the issuance of an injunction staying litiga-
tion against nondebtors is probably section 105.
27 E.g., In re Kasual Kreation, Inc., 54 Bankr. 915 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985) (guaran-
tor); In re Comark, 53 Bankr. 945 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1985) (partner); In re Arrow Huss,
Inc., 51 Bankr. 853 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985) (guarantor); In re Otero Mills, Inc., 21 Bankr.
777 (Bankr. D.N.M.) (guarantor), aff'd, 25 Bankr. 1018 (D.N.M. 1982).
28 In In re Venture Properties, 37 Bankr. 175 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1984), the court al-
luded to the similarity between section 2(a) (15) of the prior Bankruptcy Act and section
105 of the Bankruptcy Code as supporting its assertion that stay protection should not
extend to co-debtors.
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1. Expanded Jurisdiction Under the Code
Perhaps the broader construction of section 105 derives from
the expanded jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court under the Code.
Although the prior Act confined the court's jurisdiction to "the
debtor and his property, wherever located," 29 the Bankruptcy Code
contains a significantly broader jurisdictional grant to the district
court, covering "all civil proceedings arising under title 11, or aris-
ing in or related to cases under title 11.'30 The district court in turn
may refer any or all proceedings to the bankruptcy judges in the
district under a complex set of rules.
3'
A civil proceeding is "related to a case under title 11" if the
29 Act ofJune 22, 1938, ch. 575, § 311, 52 Stat. 906 (1938). See In re Monroe Well
Serv., 67 Bankr. 746, 753 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986) ("the court's jurisdiction [under the
previous Act] was in rem").
30 28 U.S.C.A. § 1334(b) (West Supp. 1987). The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978), had placed this broad jurisdiction in the dis-
trict court but provided that the bankruptcy court "shall exercise all of the jurisdiction
conferred by this section on the district courts." 28 U.S.C. § 1471(c), superseded by 28
U.S.C.A. § 1334 (West Supp. 1987). In addition, 28 U.S.C. § 1471(e) provided the
bankruptcy court with jurisdiction over all property of the debtor as of the commence-
ment of the case. In response to the Supreme Court's opinion in Northern Pipeline
Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982), finding the bankruptcy
courts established by the 1978 Act unconstitutional, Congress enacted a different juris-
dictional scheme in 1984. Bankruptcy Amendments and FederalJudgeship Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984). The 1984 amendments placed bankruptcy ju-
risdiction in the district court, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1334 (West Supp. 1987), which may refer
any and all cases and proceedings under title 11 to the bankruptcy court. 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 157 (West Supp. 1987). The district court also has exclusive jurisdiction over prop-
erty of the debtor as of the commencement of the case, and over property of the estate.
28 U.S.C.A. § 1334(d) (West Supp. 1987).
31 28 U.S.C.A. § 157 (West Supp. 1987).
Bankruptcy judges to whom cases and proceedings are referred may "hear and de-
termine ... all core proceedings.., and may enter appropriate orders and judgments."
28 U.S.C.A. § 157(b)(1) (West Supp. 1987). A bankruptcy judge may also hear a
noncore proceeding that is related to a bankruptcy case that was filed under title 11, but,
absent consent of all the parties, he must submit proposed findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law to the district court, which alone has the power to enter orders and judg-
ments on noncore matters, and may review the bankruptcy judge's findings de novo. 28
U.S.C.A. § 157(c)(1) (West Supp. 1987).
A suit by a creditor against a co-debtor who is not himself in bankruptcy is a non-
core proceeding under section 157(c). See 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTcY (15th ed.), supra
note 15, 3.01[2][b][ii]. An attempt by the debtor to stay the creditor's action, however,
is not intended to resolve the parties' state law rights. See In re Monroe Well Serv., 67
Bankr. 746, 754 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986); In re Rustic Mfg., 55 Bankr. 25, 28-29 (Bankr.
W.D. Wis. 1985). If the basis for obtaining a co-debtor stay is prevention of interference
with the reorganization process, arguably the stay is part of the administration of the
debtor's estate, or at least a type of "other proceedings affecting.., the adjustment of
the debtor-creditor or the equity security holder relationship." 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 157(b)(2)(O) (West Supp. 1987). The stay is not the type of proceeding that the
Supreme Court found objectionable in Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe
Line Co., 488 U.S. 50 (1982). Therefore, the co-debtor stay proceeding constitutes a
core proceeding that a bankruptcy court may hear and determine.
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outcome of the proceeding would affect the estate being adminis-
tered in bankruptcy.3 2 Because the co-debtor often justifies a stay
request with the argument that staying the direct action will aid the
debtor's reorganization effort, the outcome of the direct action
against the co-debtor will have an effect on the bankruptcy case.
Thus, the bankruptcy court has jurisdiction to hear the co-debtor
stay request.33 If lack of jurisdiction formed the basis for denying
co-debtor stays under the Bankruptcy Act, then the expanded juris-
diction in the Code may have encouraged courts to construe section
105 to permit co-debtor stays in some circumstances, notwithstand-
ing the pre-Code cases.
3 4
Interpreting section 105 in light of the Code's expanded juris-
diction is consistent with the legislative intent to expand the power
as well as the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts.35 The theme
running through the legislative history of the Code is one of en-
abling the bankruptcy courts to do virtually anything necessary and
appropriate to effectuate the purposes of the bankruptcy law.3 6 This
would include, in the reorganization context, appropriate action to
aid the debtor's reorganization effort.
2. Co-debtor Stays Elsewhere in the Code
Before accepting the proposition that section 105 and the
broadened jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court expands the availa-
32 See, e.g., Pacor Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3d Cir. 1984).
33 Although the court has jurisdiction based on the effect on the debtor's estate, the
court could not appropriately issue an injunction under section 105 unless the action
caused a significant adverse effect on the estate. See infra Section II(A). A court also
could conceivably assert jurisdiction using the section 1334 "arising under" language-
the debtor seeks the co-debtor stay under section 105, therefore the stay may "aris[e]
under" that section.
34 See, e.g., In re Monroe Well Serv., 67 Bankr. 746, 753 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986); In re
Lion Capital Group, 44 Bankr. 690, 701 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984). But see In re Aboussie
Bros. Constr. Co., 8 Bankr. 302 (E.D. Mo. 1981) (finding no jurisdiction under 1978
Bankruptcy Code to stay actions against nonbankrupt debtors).
35 Section 105(a) is a major departure from pre-Code law in that it is in no
way circumscribed by possession or custody of a res. The basic purpose
of the section is to enable the court to do whatever is necessary to aid its
jurisdiction, i.e., anything arising in or relating to a bankruptcy case. This
might affect third parties who pose a threat to the bankruptcy case, even
if there is no res involved and no state court suit pending.
2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY (15th ed.), supra note 15, 105.02, at 105-03.
36 A major impetus underlying this reform legislation has been the
need to enlarge the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court ....
[E]xcept where the bankruptcy court abstains from hearing an action or
proceeding... all cases under title 11 and all civil actions and proceed-
ings arising under or related to cases under title 11 are to be before the
bankruptcy judge.
S. REP. No. 989, supra note 6, at 17-18, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws at 5803-04.
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bility of co-debtor stays to Chapter 11, it is necessary to reconcile
the absence of an explicit co-debtor stay provision in Chapter 11
with the limited co-debtor stay provisions of section 1301 for Chap-
ter 13 consumer cases3 7 and section 1201 for Chapter 12 family
farmer cases.38 The existence of these express stay provisions indi-
cates that Congress was aware of the possibility of a co-debtor stay
and knew how to authorize one when it thought it appropriate. The
absence of co-debtor stay language in Chapter 11 may be viewed as
implying, therefore, that Congress had no desire to overrule pre-
Code cases and enact a co-debtor stay outside of Chapters 12 and
13.39
The different operation of a co-debtor stay in Chapters 12 and
13 as compared to a Chapter 11 co-debtor stay may lend some sup-
port to the belief that Chapter 11 does not authorize such a stay.
Section 1201 and 1301 co-debtor stays generally remain operative
37 Bankruptcy Code § 1301 (West 1979 & Supp. 1987). The full text of section
1301 is as follows:
(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) of this section, after the
order for relief under this chapter, a creditor may not act, or commence
or continue any civil action, to collect all or any part of a consumer debt
of the debtor from any individual that is liable on such debt with the
debtor, or that secured such debt, unless-
(1) such individual became liable on or secured such debt in the
ordinary course of such individual's business; or
(2) the case is closed, dismissed, or converted to a case under chap-
ter 7 or 11 of this title.
(b) A creditor may present a negotiable instrument, and may give notice
of dishonor of such an instrument.
(c) On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the
court shall grant relief from the stay provided by subsection (a) of this
section with respect to a creditor, to the extent that-
(1) as between the debtor and the individual protected under sub-
section (a) of this section, such individual received the consideration for
the claim held by such creditor;
(2) the plan filed by the debtor proposes not to pay such claim; or
(3) such creditor's interest would be irreparably harmed by contin-
uation of such stay.
(d) Twenty days after the filing of a request under subsection (c)(2) of
this section for relief from the stay provided by subsection (a) of this sec-
tion, such stay is terminated with respect to the party in interest making
such request, unless the debtor or any individual that is liable on such
debt with the debtor files and serves upon such party in interest a written
objection to the taking of the proposed action.
Id.
38 Bankruptcy Code § 1201 (West Supp. 1987). The text of section 1201 is almost
identical to that of section 130 1. See supra note 37. The only difference is the omission
from section 1201 of language concerning conversion of the case to a case under Chap-
ter 11. This omission recognizes that a Chapter 12 case may not be converted to Chap-
ter 11. Bankruptcy Code § 1208. See In re Christy, 80 Bankr. 361 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1987).
39 See Austin v. Unarco Indus., 705 F.2d I (1st Cir.) (rejecting applicability of sec-
tion 362 to co-defendants and alluding to section 1301 as evidence of legislature's abil-
ity to authorize co-debtor stay explicitly when intended), cert. dismissed, 463 U.S. 1217
(1983).
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only to the extent that the debtor proposes a plan that calls for pay-
ment of the obligation.40 In the Chapter 11 context, however, the
debtor will not yet even have proposed a plan when the co-debtor
stay request arises, and will not yet have begun making payments on
the obligation.4 ' Thus, the creditor of a Chapter 11 debtor is in a
much worse position if the court stays the creditor's action against
co-debtors than a creditor stayed by section 1201 or 1301. In Chap-
ter 11 the creditor is unlikely to be receiving payments while the stay
is in effect; nor can it be certain that the plan will provide for full
payment of its claim. When a court issues a co-debtor stay in Chap-
ter 11, therefore, the court is not only expanding upon pre-Code
law, but it is doing so in a manner that goes beyond even the ex-
press co-debtor stays that Congress did enact in sections 1201 and
1301.
Nevertheless, Congress did not explicitly reject the concept of a
co-debtor stay in proceedings other than Chapters 12 and 13, and
the broad language of section 105, coupled with the court's ex-
panded jurisdiction, provides some basis for such a stay.42 Indeed,
the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code shows that Congress
intended courts to construe their section 105 power broadly.
43
Furthermore, the different way in which a Chapter 11 co-debtor
stay takes effect lends support to the belief that the explicit stays in
sections 362, 1201, and 1301 are not evidence of an intention to bar
a co-debtor stay in Chapter 11. The explicit debtor and co-debtor
stay provisions in the Bankruptcy Code operate automatically. To
obtain a co-debtor stay in Chapter 11, on the other hand, the debtor
(or trustee)44 must seek the co-debtor stay. Thus, a creditor of a
40 A creditor may obtain relief from the section 1301 stay to the extent that the
debtor's plan does not propose payment of the claim. Bankruptcy Code § 1301(c)(2).
The stay is automatically terminated 20 days after a request for relief under section
1301(c)(2) unless the debtor or co-debtor files a written objection to such termination.
Courts may also grant relief from the stay if, inter alia, the creditor's "interest would be
irreparably harmed by continuation of such stay." Bankruptcy Code § 1301(c)(3). This
would seem to require a showing of an imminent adverse change in the co-debtor's
circumstances. See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 6, at 426, reinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 6381-82.
41 Cf In re AJ. Mackay Co., 50 Bankr. 756 (C.D. Utah 1985) (Chapter 11 co-debtor
stay unavailable in confirmed plan; only basis for stay is to ease plan proposal and confir-
mation process).
42 See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 6, at 342, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws at 6298; S. REP. No. 989, supra note 6, at 51, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 5837 ("The court has ample other powers to stay actions not
covered by the automatic stay. Section 105, of proposed title 11, derived from Bank-
ruptcy Act § 2a(15), grants the power to issue orders necessary or appropriate to carry
out the provisions of title 11."). See also infra note 154.
43 See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 6, at 342, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws at 6298.
44 Bankruptcy Code section 1107 authorizes a debtor in possession to exercise
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Chapter 11 debtor may generally take action against co-debtors, un-
less the court has specifically forbidden such actions.
In omitting an explicit co-debtor stay from Chapter 11, there-
fore, Congress may simply have beeri rejecting any automatic bar to
actions against co-debtors. Congress may also have intended to put
the burden of moving for a stay on the debtor, rather than requiring
the creditor to show why a court should modify or dissolve a stay.45
Neither the rejection of an automatic bar nor the different distribu-
tion of burdens should prevent a court from using its broad section
105 injunctive power when appropriate.
46
However, the omission of an explicit co-debtor stay provision
from Chapter 11, the explicit Chapter 12 and 13 co-debtor stays,
and the pre-Code cases limiting the court's power to enjoin actions
against co-debtors, do suggest that a court should use its section
105 power sparingly and in only the clearest cases. 47 Moreover, be-
cause the debtor must take affirmative action to obtain a co-debtor
stay, a court has the opportunity to limit the scope and effect of the
most of the powers of a trustee. See also Bankruptcy Code § 1106. The court may order
the appointment of a trustee either for cause or if the appointment is in the interest of
creditors, equity security holders, and other interests of the estate. Bankruptcy Code
§ 1104(a).
45 See Bankruptcy Code §§ 362(d), 1201(c), 1301(c) (West 1979 & Supp. 1987). But
see Bankruptcy Code § 362(g) (party requesting relief has burden of proving lack of eq-
uity in property but party opposing relief (debtor) has burden of proof on all other
issues). Section 1301 originally required notice and a hearing before a party in interest
could obtain relief from a co-debtor stay under that section. In 1984 Congress added
subsection (d), which provides for automatic termination of the stay 20 days after a re-
quest for relief based on the absence of a payment provision in the debtor's plan, unless
the debtor timely objects to termination of the stay. Bankruptcy Amendments and Fed-
eraljudgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, §§ 313, 524, 98 Stat. 333, 355-56, 388.
The creditor seeking relief must still initiate the process, however, and the stay remains
in effect until it is properly terminated.
46 Congress made clear that a court may stay actions exempted from the section
362 automatic stay using its general injunctive power:
Stays or injunctions issued under [section 105] will not be automatic
upon the commencement of the case, but will be granted or issued under
the usual rules for the issuance of injunctions. By excepting an act or
action from the automatic stay, the bill simply requires that the trustee
move the court into action, rather than requiring the stayed party to re-
quest relief from the stay. There are some actions . . . that generally
should not be stayed automatically upon the commencement of the case,
for reasons of either policy or practicality. Thus, the court will have to
determine on a case-by-case basis whether a particular action which may
be harming the estate should be stayed.
H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 6, at 342, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 6298.
47 In addition, the jurisdictional problems raised in Northern Pipeline Constr. Co.
v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982), and the Congressional response to those
problems in the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333, suggest that bankruptcy courts should not overextend the
reach of their injunctive power.
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A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING Co-DEBTOR
STAY REQUESTS
A. Identifying Competing Bankruptcy and Nonbankruptcy
Interests
As a general rule, bankruptcy should not affect a creditor's
rights against nonbankrupt third parties.49 In many cases, the credi-
tor will have relied on expected rights against third parties in ex-
tending credit to the debtor; any interference with the creditor's
actions against the parties may well frustrate these expectations.
For example, when a creditor requires a guaranty from a third party
as a condition for extending credit, the creditor protects itself
against the principal debtor's bankruptcy as well as other defaults.
Similarly, in extending credit to a partnership, creditors may be re-
lying on the unlimited liability of the general partners as well as the
business assets and future income of the partnership. Presumably
the creditor agrees to extend credit or sets the terms of the loan at
least in part in reliance upon this additional avenue of recovery.
This additional avenue of recovery, however, loses much of its value
if a court later delays or prevents its enforcement.
Even if a creditor did not rely on a co-debtor's liability, interfer-
ing with the direct action will often implicate other interests. For
instance, the tax collector will not have relied on co-debtor liability
in "permitting" a debtor to incur tax liability, but society's interest
in collectirig taxes and preventing tax avoidance-interests that lead
us to impose certain tax liabilities on principals of a corporate
debtor-will suffer if a court stays actions against those corporate
principals. Similarly, although tort claimants do not rely on the
existence of insurance when they incur claims against a debtor, if
bankruptcy interferes with the enforcement of claims against insur-
48 Other potential statutory bases for a co-debtor stay exist, but none is as strong
section 105. Some courts have held that they may stay certain actions against co-debtors
under section 362. E.g., A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
107 S. Ct. 251 (1986). These include actions against parties who are so identified with
the debtor as to make the action in effect one against the debtor. Id. at 999; Seybolt v.
Bio-Energy of Lincoln, 38 Bankr. 123 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984). They also include actions
that affect property of the debtor. A.H. Robins, 788 F.2d at 1001; In re Davis, 730 F.2d
176 (5th Cir. 1984). In addition, the bankruptcy court is a court of equity, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1334 (Supp. III 1985), and as such has inherent power to grant a stay as part of the
"efficient management of its docket." A.H. Robins, 788 F.2d at 1003.
49 E.g., Bankruptcy Code § 524(e) (1982) ("Except as provided... discharge of a
debt of the debtor does not affect the liability of any other entity on, or the property of
any other entity for, such debt.").
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ers it may frustrate society's interest in compensating such
claimants.
Yet, in reality, bankruptcy does interfere with many of the rights
and expectations of creditors. Bankruptcy is a collective proceeding
intended to maximize the assets available to all creditors and to dis-
tribute those assets equitably among creditors. In reorganization,
where most co-debtor stay requests arise, a plan for the continued
operation of the debtor and the satisfaction of creditor claims will
often best serve the maximization and distribution goals. Bank-
ruptcy law protects the debtor from individual creditors in order to
more equitably benefit all of the creditors. The emphasis, however,
is on protection of the debtor for the benefit of creditors. Thus, any
interference with creditors' rights against third parties should be
limited to furthering bankruptcy's goals of maximizing the assets
available to creditors and equitably distributing those assets among
creditors.
The co-debtor stay blocks the nonbankruptcy remedy normally
available to, and often relied upon by, the creditor and thus disrupts
the nonbankruptcy scheme for protecting creditors. Therefore, the
stay-an extraordinary equitable remedy-is appropriate only if the
benefit to the bankruptcy system outweighs the interference with the
nonbankruptcy system. In deciding whether to stay actions against
co-debtors, a court's first consideration must be whether permitting
the direct action to proceed will significantly interfere with the bank-
ruptcy process or its underlying policies.
One underlying bankruptcy goal in a reorganization "is to
restructure a business's finances so that it may continue to operate,
provide its employees with jobs, pay its creditors, and produce a
return for its stockholders."5 0 To that end, "[tlhe stay gives the
50 H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 6, at 220, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 6179.
Professor Jackson has argued that the notion of keeping firms in business is not a
bankruptcy policy, and that firms should be kept in business only when the value to
creditors and shareholders of maintaining the business as a going concern, with consid-
eration of the risks imposed, exceeds the value of liquidating the firm. The calculation
should be no different within bankruptcy than without. See T. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND
LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAw 23-25 (1986). Professor Jackson maintains that the purpose
of bankruptcy law is to maximize the pool of assets available for distribution and to
distribute those assets in accordance with nonbankruptcy rules. Id. Although some
commentators have disagreed with this characterization of bankruptcy law, see, e.g., War-
ren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775 (1987); Carlson, Philosophy in Bankruptcy, 85
MICH. L. REV. 1341 (1987) (reviewing T. JACKSON, supra); but see Baird, Loss Distribution,
Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 815 (1987), all seem
to agree that maximization of the available assets will often require preservation of the
going concern value of the business. Co-debtor stay issues arise after the decision has
been made to attempt to preserve the operating business, regardless of the standard
applied to reach that decision.
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debtor the opportunity to bring all of its creditors together for dis-
cussion, explanation of the debtor's financial problems, and negoti-
ation. Creditors are prevented from acting unilaterally to gain an
advantage over other creditors or to pressure the debtor into ac-
tion."5 1 As the case proceeds, the business may continue to operate
and the debtor, under the supervision of the court, takes actions
necessary to reduce losses and preserve the value of the business.
52
All of this, of course, requires the attention of the principals of the
debtor.
If related litigation against the principals of a debtor prevents
them from devoting their undivided time and energy to the debtor's
reorganization effort, the litigation will interfere with the bank-
ruptcy goals. Collateral litigation may thwart the policy of encour-
aging the parties to negotiate and implement a reorganization plan.
If the principals of the debtor cannot devote the proper energy to
manage the debtor, liquidation, rather than successful reorganiza-
tion, may be more likely. Moreover, related litigation against the
principals may drain resources from the debtor if the debtor must
aid the principals with discovery requests or provide essential
information.
Similarly, if the debtor is relying on its principals to fund a reor-
ganization plan, direct actions against co-debtor principals may re-
duce their ability to provide funds to the debtor. If the litigation
against the principals is successful, funds earmarked for the reor-
ganization, which would presumably benefit all creditors, would in-
stead ultimately benefit only the creditor directly suing the
principals.
If a particular creditor "grabs" assets that would have been
available for the benefit of creditors generally, or to a class of credi-
tors, then that too will interfere with bankruptcy policy. If the assets
are "property of the estate," then the trustee will be able to recover
them from the overreaching creditor.53 Yet, even if the assets are
not technically property of the estate, permitting the trustee to over-
see their use or distribution instead of relegating the creditors to a
race to the courthouse may better serve bankruptcy's equitable dis-
tribution policy.
The degree to which litigation against a co-debtor interferes
with bankruptcy goals will vary with the particular facts of the case.
51 H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 6, at 220, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws at 6180.
52 Id.
53 Bankruptcy Code § 549 (West 1979 & Supp. 1987) (authorizing trustee to avoid
post-petition transfers). Cf., Bankruptcy Code § 547 (West Supp. 1987) (authorizing




To some extent, any litigation against a principal will divert some of
his attention from the business and may adversely affect his ability to
fund a plan. For that matter, a divorce or death in the family may
have a similar effect. The bankruptcy court is simply not an appro-
priate forum for stopping the clock on a principal's life in an effort
to retain his undivided energy and attention. The principal can ob-
tain the benefit of a bankruptcy stay by filing his own bankruptcy
petition and submitting himself to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy
court.5 4 Absent such submission, the court should not interfere
with nonbankruptcy remedies against the principal except in ex-
traordinary circumstances.
Thus, the debtor, not the co-debtor, properly has standing to
seek a co-debtor stay. Because the co-debtor has not submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court through his own
bankruptcy filing, the co-debtor has effectively foregone that protec-
tion.5 5 Any co-debtor stay is strictly for the protection of the
debtor, not the co-debtor. This is easily overlooked because, as a
practical matter, the co-debtor often seeks the stay, notwithstanding
that he does so through the debtor. Nevertheless, keeping the two
parties separate is important in order to focus on the debtor's need
for the stay rather than the co-debtor's desire for protection.
Furthermore, bankruptcy should not interfere with actions un-
related to the debtor in bankruptcy. For example, the mere fact that
a principal must deal with other aspects of his life while the debtor's
reorganization proceeds fails to justify extending the protection of
the bankruptcy court. Entities who dealt with the principal in his
capacity as principal may have assumed some risk that the adverse
financial condition of the debtor would affect their dealings. Those
who dealt with the principal as an individual unrelated to the
debtor, however, assumed no such risk and should not suffer ad-
verse consequences flowing from the unrelated bankruptcy of the
debtor.
If a direct action against a co-debtor does not significantly inter-
fere with underlying bankruptcy policies, then the court should per-
mit the action to proceed. If the action does cause significant
interference, then the court must determine whether any policy un-
derlying the nonbankruptcy action is strong enough to override the
54 See, e.g., In re Juneau's Builders Center, 57 Bankr. 254, 256-57, 258-59 (Bankr.
M.D. La. 1986); In re Kalispell Feed and Grain Supply, 55 Bankr. 627 (Bankr. D. Mont.
1985).
55 The court emphasized this in In re Venture Properties, 37 Bankr. 175 (Bankr.
D.N.H. 1984). See also Rosenberg, Partnership Reorganization Under the Bankruptcy Reform
Act: Filling in the Interstices, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1173, 1194 (1981) (partner always free to
file for bankruptcy as individual, but until he does so, both individual and partnership
creditors can pursue him).
[Vol. 73:213230
CO-DEBTOR STAYS
bankruptcy policies. Where there are strong political or economic
reasons for permitting the nonbankruptcy action to proceed, then a
court must balance these against the interference with bankruptcy
policies. 56 In addition, where criminal laws or tax laws are involved,
a court must consider whether the importance of the bankruptcy
policies outweighs the public policies underlying those laws.
In this regard it is important to remember that any co-debtor
stay is, by its nature, temporary. Section 524(e) of the Bankruptcy
Code states that discharge of a debtor does not affect the liability of
third parties on an obligation.57 Thus, the stay will expire either on
its own terms or upon the close of the case, and the creditor may
proceed against the co-debtor.
Notwithstanding the temporary nature of the stay, however, the
delay that a stay causes may be substantial, and may adversely affect
the creditor's rights. Thus, only when the balance clearly favors the
bankruptcy goals should a court consider granting a co-debtor stay.
The court will have to strike this balance based on all of the
facts and circumstances before it. As the next section of this Article
shows, a variety of factors may reasonably come into play. Certainly
a court must compare the benefit to the debtor with the actual cost
to the creditor. Similarly, a court must carefully consider the impor-
tance of the bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy policies that the stay
request implicates. In addition, a court should consider the under-
lying basis for the co-debtor's liability. If the debtor is to receive
the protection of a co-debtor staya-albeit indirect protection-then
the debtor should have received the benefit originally. Moreover, it
is reasonable for the court to consider the debtor's general business
practices, the purpose of its Chapter 11 filing, and whether the
debtor and co-debtor have dealt fairly and openly with the creditor
in the particular transaction at issue. 58 In other words, because any
co-debtor stay is an equitable remedy, the court should consider all
the equities inherent in the positions of the various parties.
B. Assigning Burdens
A court will have difficulty determining with mathematical pre-
cision most of the factors involved in balancing the bankruptcy and
nonbankruptcy policies. Because a co-debtor stay in Chapter 11 is
an extraordinary remedy, the debtor should bear the burden of ini-
56 E.g., Kelly v. Robinson, 107 S. Ct. 353 (1986) (criminal law); Penn Terra Ltd. v.
Dep't of Envtl. Resources, 733 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1984) (environmental law).
57 Bankruptcy Code § 524(e) (1982).
58 Nimmer, Secured Creditors and the Automatic Stay: Variable Bargain Models of Fairness,
68 MINN. L. REv. 1, 17 (1983).
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tially going forward with evidence and of proving the need for a co-
debtor stay.
Because the basis of the stay is the interference with the bank-
ruptcy process, the debtor's initial burden is to show that pursuit of
the action against the co-debtor would severely and adversely affect
the reorganization effort. In making this showing, the debtor must
prove both that interference would result, and that without such in-
terference there would be a reasonable probability of a successful
reorganization. After all, if the reorganization effort is likely to fail
regardless of whether the action against the co-debtor proceeds,
there is little reason to stay the action.59
When the debtor seeks a stay early in the case, showing the
probability of a successful reorganization plan will be difficult, be-
cause the debtor is unlikely to have effectively sorted out its affairs at
that point. In that case, some leniency would be appropriate. 60 Per-
haps early in the case it would suffice to show that a successful effort
is not impossible.6' As the case proceeds, however, the court
should review this finding, and if success appears less likely, the
court may lift any co-debtor stay that was previously imposed.
Once the debtor has met the threshold burden of showing the
interference and the probability of a successful reorganization, the
burden should shift to the creditor to provide evidence showing that
a co-debtor stay would seriously interfere with nonbankruptcy poli-
cies underlying the creditor's claim. Assigning this burden to the
creditor is appropriate because the creditor best understands the
basis of its claim and can best determine the manner of interference
with the policies underlying that claim. Nevertheless, because a co-
debtor stay is an extraordinary remedy, once the creditor introduces
some evidence, the burden of proving that the bankruptcy policies
outweigh the nonbankruptcy policies should be on the debtor.
Thus, the debtor should show that the court's failure to grant a stay
would impede the reorganization process more than a stay would
impede the nonbankruptcy policies involved.
59 Cf United Say. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 108 S. Ct. 626, 632
(1988) ("What [section 362(d) (2)] requires is not merely a showing that if there is con-
ceivably to be an effective reorganization, this property will be needed for it; but that the
property is essential for an effective reorganization that is in prospect.... There must be
Ia reasonable possibility of a successful reorganization within a reasonable time.'"
(quoting In re Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 808 F.2d 363, 370-71 & nn. 12-13 (5th
Cir. 1987) (en banc), aff'd sub nom. United Sav. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest As-
socs., 108 S. Ct. 626 (1988)).
60 See, e.g., In re Monroe Well Serv., 67 Bankr. 746, 755 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986); In re
Dore & Assocs. Contracting, 54 Bankr. 353, 359 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1985).
61 If such an effort is not possible, the appropriate course for creditors is to convert
the case to a liquidation. See Bankruptcy Code § 1112 (West 1979 & Supp. 1987).
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C. Protecting the Creditor
Even if the debtor carries its burden, and the court stays the
creditor's action against the co-debtor, the extraordinary nature of
the remedy may require that the debtor provide the creditor with
some protection of the creditor's rights against the co-debtor. This
is analogous to the position of a secured creditor of the debtor.
Both the secured creditor and the creditor with a right of action
against a co-debtor have rights separate from their in personam
right against the debtor. Both look to those rights as an additional,
and at times a preferable, means of collecting their claims. Just as
bankruptcy law protects the secured creditor 62 similar protection is
appropriate when a court imposes a co-debtor stay.
In some cases, the creditor will have only an unsecured claim
against the co-debtor, with no particular right to any of the co-
debtor's property. A stay would prevent the creditor from obtaining
the judgment necessary to establish a right to that property, as well
as prevent the creditor from enforcing any pre-existingjudgment. 63
While a co-debtor stay remains in effect, other creditors of the co-
debtor-perhaps creditors with claims unrelated to the debtor-
might obtain judgments against the co-debtor and interests in the
co-debtor's property that would take priority over the stayed credi-
tor's claim.64 Moreover, the co-debtor might transfer or encumber
his property, putting it beyond the reach of the creditor. Finally, the
co-debtor might simply dissipate his assets, leaving nothing for the
creditor when the stay expires. 65
In view of these potential adverse effects, protection for the
creditor should accompany the co-debtor stay. If the creditor be-
62 Bankruptcy Code §§ 361, 362(d), 363(e) (West 1979 & Supp. 1987) (all requir-
ing adequate protection of secured party's interest). See also United Say. Ass'n v. Tim-
bers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 108 S. Ct. 626 (1988) (discussing scope of protection
required when secured party delayed in asserting state law remedies against debtor's
property); In re Briggs Transp. Co., 780 F.2d 1339 (8th Cir. 1985); Grundy Nat'l Bank v.
Tandem Mining Corp., 754 F.2d 1436 (4th Cir. 1985); In re American Mariner Indus.,
734 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1984).
63 In the tax context, it would prevent the Internal Revenue Service from obtaining
a tax lien on the co-debtor's property. See I.R.C. §§ 6321-23 (West 1979 & Supp. 1987).
64 In general, the rule in debtor-creditor relations is first in time, first in right.
Thus, if other creditors obtain interests in the co-debtor's property while a court stays
one creditor, the other creditors will normally have priority to that property. See, e.g.,
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 5202 (McKinney 1978 & Supp. 1987). See also U.C.C. §§ 9-201,
9-301 (1) (b) (1972) (perfected secured party has priority over subsequent lien creditor).
65 Fraudulent conveyance law will offer the creditor some protection, permitting a
creditor to recover from a transferee property transferred for inadequate consideration.
UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT §§ 4, 5, 7A U.L.A. 474 (1918); UNIF. FRAUDULENT
TRANSFER ACT § 4, 7A U.L.A. 652 (1984). This would not help the creditor if the credi-
tor cannot locate the transferred property, or if the dissipation involved consumption of
the property.
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lieves that protection of his interest is appropriate, he should de-
mand the protection when the debtor requests a stay. Because the
debtor and co-debtor best know how they might protect the credi-
tor, the debtor should propose the means of adequate protection,
which the court may approve or reject.66 Such protection might
take the form of a lien on the co-debtor's property during the pen-
dency of the stay, an injunction barring the co-debtor from transfer-
ring or encumbering his assets, the posting of some bond to protect
the creditor, or other appropriate relief.
6 7
If the creditor has already obtained an interest in the co-
debtor's property, then protection would assure that the value of
the creditor's interest does not decrease while the stay remains in
effect. 68 Certainly the creditor with a secured claim against a third
party should receive at least as much protection as a creditor with a
secured claim against the debtor.69 When the co-debtor is an indi-
vidual, the type of assets involved will usually not rapidly depreciate
in value.70 In that case, a court should have no difficultly devising
appropriate protection for the creditor. In the event that the prop-
erty is rapidly depreciating, a court may require periodic payments
to the creditor to protect the value of the creditor's interest in the
collateral. 7 1
The extraordinary nature of the co-debtor stay also dictates that
66 This would parallel the procedure for providing adequate protection in other
bankruptcy contexts. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Code §§ 362(d)(1) (automatic stay), 363(e)
(use, sale, or lease of property) (West 1979 & Supp. 1987).
67 Cf. Bankruptcy Code § 361 (West 1979 & Supp. 1987). Because the co-debtor is
not in bankruptcy, interest should continue to accumulate against him, and the question
of whether the creditor is entitled to recover its "opportunity cost" should not arise. See
also United Sav. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 108 S. Ct. 626 (1988);
Grundy Nat'l Bank v. Tandem Mining Corp., 754 F.2d 1436 (4th Cir. 1985); In re Briggs
Transp. Co., 780 F.2d 1339 (8th Cir. 1985); In re American Mariner Indus., 734 F.2d
426 (9th Cir. 1984). American Mariner may, however, provide a basis for requiring that
the co-debtor make periodic interest payments when a stay delays payment of the princi-
pal. American Mariner, 734 F.2d at 435. Because the adequate protection requirement in
these co-debtor stay cases is not directly derived from Bankruptcy Code sections 361
and 362, such interest payments are apparently not barred by the Timbers of Inwood case.
68 Cf Bankruptcy Code § 361 (West 1979 & Supp. 1987).
69 See Bankruptcy Code § 362(d)(1) (West Supp. 1987).
70 When adequate protection problems arise in the business context, the collateral
is usually inventory, accounts, or equipment, the value of which may change significantly
during the pendency of the stay. This problem should not arise with respect to the most
common personal assets that co-debtors likely have given as security.
71 It is unclear whether the debtor or the co-debtor should more appropriately
make these payments. The justification for a co-debtor stay is that the debtor benefits;
therefore, the debtor might reasonably pay for that benefit. This is particularly true if
the co-debtor's property will help fund the reorganization effort. If the property re-
mains with the co-debtor, however, the co-debtor more directly benefits. As a general
rule, the co-debtor is the more appropriate party to make the periodic payments both




its scope and duration be no greater than necessary. Unlike the sec-
tion 362 stay, which may last for the duration of the case,72 the co-
debtor stay should expire as soon as the extraordinary protection of
the co-debtor is no longer necessary to further the debtor's reorgan-
ization.73 Thus, for example, if a court issues a stay because a prin-
cipal's efforts are necessary to enable a debtor to adjust to
operations under Chapter 11, the stay should expire upon comple-
tion of that adjustment. 74 If at that time another basis for such a
stay exists, the debtor must persuade the court of that new basis.
III
APPLYING Co-DEBTOR STAY PRINCIPLES
The balance of this article applies the general analysis devel-
oped above to the four most common situations in which a debtor
will seek a co-debtor stay. This extended analysis will clarify and
develop the competing interests a co-debtor stay implicates, as well
as provide parties and courts with further, more concrete guidance
when co-debtor stay issues arise. The first section considers co-
debtor stays when a guarantor will provide funds for the overall re-
organization of the debtor, and when the direct action against the
co-debtor will otherwise interfere with the debtor's effort to reor-
ganize. The next section analyzes stays of actions against general
partners of a debtor partnership. The third section discusses the
right of the Internal Revenue Service to recover "trust fund" taxes
from a principal of a debtor. Although much of the analysis devel-
oped in the context of guarantors applies, there are several addi-
tional issues that merit separate treatment. The final section
analyzes co-debtor stay requests where the direct action is against an
insurer of the debtor.
A. Personal Guaranties
1. Guarantor to Provide Funding for Reorganization
Probably the most common situation in which a debtor seeks a
co-debtor stay in Chapter 11 involves an action on a personal guar-
anty given by a principal of a debtor corporation. Because claims
against a corporation can generally be satisfied only out of corpo-
rate assets, 75 when there is any doubt about a corporation's future
72 Bankruptcy Code § 362(c)(2) (West 1979 & Supp. 1987).
73 E.g., In re A.J. Mackay Co., 50 Bankr. 756 (C.D. Utah 1985) (although temporary
co-debtor stay during plan formulation court may issue, permanent co-debtor stay in
reorganization plan is impermissible).
74 E.g., In re Arrow Huss, Inc., 51 Bankr. 853 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985).
75 H. HENN &J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BusINEss ENTER-
PRISES § 73 (3d ed. 1983).
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ability to satisfy its obligations, creditors may seek guaranties from
the principals. If the corporation subsequently petitions for bank-
ruptcy, the creditors holding guaranties naturally will want to pro-
ceed against the guarantors immediately. 76
Bankruptcy of a corporation should not normally interfere with
a creditor's action against a guarantor. The very purpose of ob-
taining a guaranty is to enable the creditor to collect from the guar-
antor if the corporation defaults. And, indeed, in most cases
enforcement of the guaranty will not interfere with the corporation's
bankruptcy. Property of the individual guarantor, not of the corpo-
rate debtor, will go to satisfy any judgment on the guaranty. Under
suretyship law the guarantor will receive a right of reimbursement
or indemnification from the corporation whose debt the guarantor
pays, 77 and he will also receive a right of subrogation to the credi-
tor's rights against the debtor.78 The practical effect of these rights,
however, is essentially to substitute the guarantor for the original
creditor.79 The section 362 automatic stay will prevent the guaran-
tor from enforcing his rights against the corporate debtor just as it
stayed the creditor from acting against the corporation or its
property.80
76 Typically, the bankruptcy filing will constitute a default under the loan agree-
ment and will trigger the guarantor's liability. If the creditor recovers from the guaran-
tor, the guarantor will have an action for reimbursement against the debtor corporation
and, in addition, may be subrogated to the rights of the creditor. See Carl, Fraudulent
Transfer Attacks on Guaranties in Bankruptcy, 60 AM. BANKR. LJ. 109 (1986). The guarantor
is, in effect, substituted for the creditor in the bankruptcy. See also Bankruptcy Code
§§ 502(e), 509 (West 1979 & Supp. 1987). Thus, from the debtor's point of view, the
liability remains the same and the debtor should have no interest in whether the guaran-
tor must pay. As a practical matter, however, because the guarantor is a principal of the
debtor, the debtor does have an interest in the collateral litigation.
Guaranties also arise outside the corporate context. An individual may guarantee
partnership obligations or obligations of another individual. Similar issues may arise
when there is a close connection between the principal debtor and the guarantor. The
guarantee of corporate debts presents the clearest example of the co-debtor stay issues
that arise in this context, however, because the guarantor is so often the moving force
behind the corporation.
77 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 104 (1941). Cf. Bankruptcy Code § 502(e)
(West Supp. 1987) (court shall disallow contribution claim where subrogation asserted).
78 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 141 (1941). Cf. Bankruptcy Code § 509
(1982 & Supp. III 1985).
79 But see In re Metal Center, 31 Bankr. 458 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1983) (guarantor enti-
tled by contract to indemnity; suit against guarantor stayed because outcome of suit
would bind debtor).
80 The guarantor seeking reimbursement may be in a better position than the credi-
tor if the guaranty, but not the creditor's loan, is secured. Under sections 502 and 509
of the Bankruptcy Code, the guarantor may elect subrogation, in which case he receives
the creditor's (unsecured) rights against the debtor, or reimbursement, in which case he
enforces his own (secured) rights against the debtor. Bankruptcy Code §§ 502, 509
(West 1979 & Supp. 1987). The guarantor may choose whichever remedy is more ad-
vantageous to him. If the guaranty is secured, therefore, the guarantor may enforce the
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Nevertheless, there are instances when enforcing a guaranty
may interfere with the successful reorganization of the debtor cor-
poration. The prime example of this occurs when the guarantor is
also planning to fund a reorganization plan out of his individual as-
sets. If the creditor enforces the guaranty, he may prevent imple-
mentation of a Chapter 11 plan that is dependent on the additional
funding. The creditor may also, in effect, receive preference 8' to
assets that would otherwise be available to all of the debtor's credi-
tors through the principal's funding of the reorganization plan.
Thus, immediate enforcement of the guaranty may adversely affect
both the bankruptcy policies of encouraging the reorganization ef-
fort and of equitably distributing available assets.
In one sense, the creditor is entitled to a "preference" because
he had the foresight to require a guaranty as a condition for ex-
tending credit to the corporation.82 The creditor's position is analo-
gous to that of a secured creditor. Both the creditor holding the
guaranty and the secured creditor obtained an alternative method of
satisfying the obligation if the debtor defaulted. In addition, both
the guaranty and the security interest are consensual security upon
which the creditor relied in extending credit. Thus, the guaranty is,
in effect, simply another form of security for repayment of a debt.
There are significant differences, however, between the security
interest and the guaranty. The security interest is a lien on property
that becomes property of the bankruptcy estate,8 3 and is, therefore,
directly within the court's jurisdiction. Moreover, the security inter-
est directly affects the debtor's assets and reduces the value of those
assets to other creditors. The guaranty, on the other hand, is an
obligation of a third party, and is neither itself an interest in prop-
erty of the estate nor directly subject to bankruptcy court jurisdic-
tion.84  In other words, the security interest represents an
enforceable property interest in bankruptcy while the guaranty rep-
security interest pursuant to his right of reimbursement. See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
(15th ed.), supra note 15, 502.05.
81 I use the term "preference" according to the lay definition. E.g., RANDOM HOUSE
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1524 (2d ed. 1987) ("the act of preferring... a
practical advantage given to one over others"). Enforcement of the guaranty would not,
of course, be considered a bankruptcy preference because the property sought is not
property of the estate while it belongs to the guarantor, and any transfer occurs after,
not before, the commencement of the bankruptcy case. See Bankruptcy Code § 547
(West 1979 & Supp. 1987) (identifying preferences for purposes of bankruptcy law). Cf.
Bankruptcy Code § 549 (West Supp. 1987) (once property becomes property of estate,
trustee in bankruptcy may void any unauthorized transfer).
82 See, e.g., In re Sondra, Inc., 44 Bankr. 205 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984).
83 Bankruptcy Code § 541(a) (West 1979 & Supp. 1987). See, e.g., United States v.
Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. 198 (1983) (property belongs to estate even after repossession).
84 See Bankruptcy Code § 541(a) (West 1979 & Supp. 1987) (only debtor's legal or
equitable interest in property is property of estate).
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resents an in personam right against a party who has not submitted
himself to bankruptcy court jurisdiction. 85
These differences are meaningful when the guarantor is not fi-
nancing a reorganization by the debtor. In that case, the guaran-
tor's assets are wholly separate from those of the debtor and would
not be available in any case for creditors who do not hold guaran-
ties. Thus, there is generally little reason to delay enforcement of
such guaranties.
8 6
If the guarantor is financing the reorganization, however, the
situation more closely resembles that of a security interest. The
guarantor's assets still do not belong to the debtor or to the credi-
tors, but the assets will be available to support a reorganization ef-
fort if the creditor holding the guaranty does not acquire them first.
Here, as with a secured creditor, any preferred position the creditor
holding a guaranty might gain should not be allowed to unduly in-
terfere with the successful implementation of a reorganization
plan. 87 Thus, if enforcement of the guaranty would interfere with
the funding of a reorganization plan, the bankruptcy court may con-
sider delaying enforcement of the guaranty.
If a court delays or prevents creditors from enforcing the guar-
anties they receive, then creditors will place less value on personal
guaranties. In many cases, inducing a creditor to lend to a less
credit worthy entity requires an effective guaranty by a solvent en-
tity. At the very least, the effectiveness of the guaranty may affect
the cost of credit because a creditor will increase the interest rate as
the risk involved increases.88 Thus, although delaying enforcement
of a guaranty may aid a particular debtor, it may harm debtors
generally.
Of course, debtors generally will suffer harm only if the ability
85 Another difference between the security interest and the guaranty is that the
debtor grants the security interest, while the guaranty is given by a third party for the
benefit of the debtor.
86 But see infra text accompanying notes 117-34.
87 See, e.g., Bankruptcy Code § 362(d) (Supp. III 1985) (court may lift or modify stay
only if property not necessary for effective reorganization).
88 See Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors' Bargain, 91
YALE Ld . 857, 875 (1982). Unlike the secured credit situation in which the price of
unsecured credit can be expected to decrease if effective security is unavailable, see
Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities: A Review of Current Theories, 10J. LEGAL
STUD. 1 (1981), because the guaranty does not drain assets from the debtor's estate,
other creditors are unaffected by the guaranty and will be unlikely to change their rates
in response to the enforceability or unenforceability of the guaranty. The only effect on
other creditors is the likelihood that the guaranteed loan will be at a lower rate if the
guaranty is effective, and the lower rate enables the debtor to devote less of its income
stream to the payment of interest on that obligation, freeing up income for other uses.




to use personal guaranties to obtain credit otherwise benefits them.
I believe that it does. With respect to corporate debtors, because
guaranties impose personal liability on principals who serve as guar-
antors, principals presumably will willingly guarantee corporate ob-
ligations only when they reasonably believe that the venture will
succeed. In effect, the guarantee may serve as a filtering mechanism
that will enable the corporate debtor to avoid ventures in which the
risks outweigh potential benefits. The burden of evaluating the op-
portunity, and the risk of failure, is to some extent shifted from the
creditor to the corporate principals, who presumably have more and
higher quality information about the opportunity. Moreover, the
personal liability undertaken through the guaranty may increase the
principals' incentive to diligently pursue and succeed in the venture.
The guarantee, therefore, enables the debtor to obtain the financ-
ing, often at a lower rate of interest, necessary to undertake a ven-
ture that has a reasonable likelihood of success. In addition, the
benefit obtained through the guaranty imposes no direct cost on the
debtor's other creditors. 89
The additional contingent liability the guarantor incurs as a re-
sult of the guaranty may adversely affect other creditors of the guar-
antor. Yet the guarantor usually receives the chance to participate
in the venture and in the potential of reward from that participation.
Absent overt fraud, this should constitute sufficient consideration to
justify the guarantor's additional liability.90 Creditors of the guaran-
tor could reasonably expect the guarantor to undertake this type of
risk. Thus, from the point of view of both the corporate debtor and
the guarantor, as well as from their respective creditors' points of
view, guaranties are worth protecting.
The effectiveness of a guaranty is reduced to the extent that a
creditor is delayed in enforcing it. Thus, just as the Bankruptcy
Code seeks to minimize the damage to the secured party's interest
that any delay in the enforcement of a security interest may cause, a
court granting a co-debtor stay request must also take pains to pro-
tect the creditor who holds a guaranty. In the secured party's case,
section 362(d) authorizes the court to lift or modify the stay of en-
forcement of the security interest: (1) for cause, including the lack
of adequate protection of the secured party's interest; or (2) when
89 This assumes that the corporation's reimbursement obligation is not secured. If
the obligation is not secured, then enforcement of the guaranty will entitle the guarantor
to substitute itself for the creditor in enforcing rights against the corporate debtor, see
supra notes 77-78, but courts will treat the guarantor as an unsecured creditor. If the
reimbursement obligation is secured, then the potential cost to other creditors is similar
to the costs imposed on them by secured credit. See generally Schwartz, supra note 88.
90 See, e.g., Blumberg, Intragroup (Upstream, Cross-Stream, and Downstream) Guaranties
Under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, 9 CARDOZO L. REv. 685, 689 (1987).
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the debtor has no equity in the property and the property is not
necessary for a successful reorganization. 9 1
Analogously, if the need for the guarantor's assets to fund the
reorganization justifies staying enforcement of the guaranty, then
the court could condition the stay on the debtor (or the guarantor)
providing adequate protection of the creditor's interest.92 While
the creditor's interest, unlike that of a secured party, is often not in
particular property, if the creditor can show that it could enforce
and collect on the guaranty but for the stay, then the court should
protect that potential recovery.
Section 361 suggests three means by which the debtor or guar-
antor might protect a creditor's interest against a decrease in value.
The debtor may make periodic payments to the creditor, offer the
creditor an additional or replacement lien on property, or otherwise
offer the creditor relief that will enable the creditor to realize "the
indubitable equivalent" of its interest.93 Because the theory behind
staying the action against the co-debtor is that the debtor receives
some tangible benefit from the stay, it would not be inappropriate to
view the debtor as responsible for protecting the creditor's interest,
at least to the extent of that benefit.
For example, when the guarantor is supplying funding to the
debtor's reorganization effort, the creditor might receive a lien on
the assets the guarantor is providing to the debtor or on other assets
of equivalent value. If the assets are decreasing in value, the debtor,
who now has use of the assets provided by the guarantor, could
make periodic payments to maintain the value of the "collateral."
94
Alternatively, a court might grant the creditor an administrative
priority in the bankruptcy proceeding to the extent that he can show
91 Bankruptcy Code § 362(d) (West Supp. 1987). See also id. § 363(e) (calling for
adequate protection when trustee uses, sells, or leases property subject to interest of
another entity).
92 See supra notes 62-74 and accompanying text.
93 Bankruptcy Code § 361(3) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
94 See supra note 71. These payments, as well as other costs of adequate protection,
would presumably come out of assets that otherwise would be available to the debtor's
other unsecured creditors. The justification for this transfer from the other creditors to
the creditor holding the guaranty is that the forbearance by the creditor enables the
debtor to use assets to maintain the going concern value of the business, thus affording
all of the creditors a larger pie from which to receive satisfaction of their claims. In
effect, the obligation would be analogous to one incurred in a section 364 post-petition
financing. Although the financing would initially come from the guarantor, protection
of the creditor is appropriate because the creditor would have obtained the assets but
for the stay. If the guarantor had paid the creditor on the guaranty and the creditor had
thereafter loaned money to the debtor under section 364, the creditor could obtain an
enforceable lien on property of the estate or be entitled to other protection. Thus, it is
really the creditor's interest in the guarantor's assets that is protected when the creditor
in this situation receives protection from the debtor.
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that the delay interfered with his ability to obtain satisfaction from
the guarantor. Because sections 361 and 362 do not directly cover
protection of a guarantor's interest, the section 361 prohibition of
the use of an administrative priority for the secured creditor as ade-
quate protection would not apply.9 5 Again, if the debtor and its
creditors are receiving a benefit from the co-debtor stay, the cost of
the stay properly rests with them.9 6
Protection of the creditor's interest through a lien, periodic
payments, or an administrative priority would be justified because
the creditor could presumably have obtained a lien on or otherwise
asserted a claim to those assets in the hands of the guarantor but for
the stay.97 To the extent that the lien or administrative priority ap-
proximates the value of the assets provided to the debtor by the
guarantor as part of the postpetition financing, protection of the
creditor's claim to those assets does not adversely affect other credi-
tors of the debtor. In effect, the guarantor may be viewed as provid-
ing postpetition financing in which the security interest or
administrative priority authorized by section 364 runs to the credi-
tor of the guarantor rather than to the guarantor himself.9 8
Of course, if the guarantor is solvent, an injunction to prevent
the guarantor from dissipating his assets may suffice to protect the
creditor. Alternatively, if assets are available, then the guarantor
could grant a lien on his available assets, retaining use and posses-
sion of them and putting off litigation over the effectiveness of the
guaranty. Or the court might require the guarantor to post a bond
95 124 CONG. REC. 32,395 (1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards); id. at 33,994-95
(statement of Sen. DiConcini); cf Bankruptcy Code § 364 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
96 See supra note 94.
97 Even if the guarantor transferred the assets to the corporate debtor before the
creditor could obtain a lien on them, the creditor might reach those assets under fraudu-
lent conveyance law if the guarantor was insolvent or rendered insolvent by the transfer
and did not receive reasonably equivalent value for the transfer. If the guarantor was
neither insolvent nor rendered insolvent by the transfer, the transfer of assets to the
debtor would not interfere with the creditor's collection effort. Moreover, no need for
staying that effort would exist because the creditor's effort would not deprive the guar-
antor of assets needed for the reorganization.
98 Provision of a lien or priority to the creditor would mean that the net addition of
assets to the estate could be zero. However, as with any post-petition secured financing,
the value to the debtor would be in increased liquidity that presumably could enable the
debtor to overcome its financial difficulty.
Note that the lien or priority that the creditor receives arises because the guarantor
has provided new value to the estate. Thus, although in other circumstances the provi-
sion of a lien to a creditor holding a guaranty could be considered a preference, here the
lien is effectively coming from new value provided by the guarantor rather than simply
from property of the estate. The payment by a guarantor of a guaranteed debt is not
considered a preference because there is no transfer of property of the debtor. See
Bankruptcy Code § 547(b); cf. Bankruptcy Code § 524(e). To the extent that the lien or
priority approximates the new value provided to the debtor, the creditor is, in effect,
receiving its lien or priority from the guarantor rather than from the debtor.
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to protect the creditor, similar to posting a bond pending appeal. 99
Even if adequate protection is available, however, a court
should not necessarily stay a creditor action on a guaranty. Section
362(d)(2) requires relief from the automatic stay of an act against
property if the debtor has no equity in the property and the prop-
erty is not necessary for an effective reorganization. A debtor has
no equity in the guarantor's property. Analogizing the co-debtor
stay to the automatic stay, a court should not stay the creditor's ac-
tion against the guarantor's property unless the property is neces-
sary for an effective reorganization.100
There are two parts to the "necessary for an effective reorgani-
zation" requirement. First, the property must be necessary' 01 and,
second, an effective reorganization must be possible.10 2 Thus, if the
creditor can show either that the reorganization effort could succeed
even without the financing from the guarantor, or that even with the
financing a successful reorganization is unlikely, a co-debtor stay is
inappropriate.
Of course, in addition to carefully reviewing a debtor's claim
that the guarantor's assets will be necessary to fund a plan and that a
successful plan is feasible, a court must determine that the guaran-
tor will in fact devote substantial assets to the reorganization should
99 See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 62(d) (appellant may obtain stay of enforcement by post-
ing supersedeas bond); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 5519 (McKinney 1978 & Supp. 1987)
(bond required in most instances in which order for payment of money stayed while on
appeal).
100 If this ground were being applied literally, it would affect only enforcement of
the guaranty against property, not a lawsuit on the guaranty. However, because a law-
suit may drain the guarantor's assets and otherwise interfere with the guarantor's ability
to fund a plan, this ground should not be applied literally in the guaranty context. In
other words, if an effective reorganization is possible with the guarantor's assets, any
action that interferes with the provision of those assets to the debtor may be stayed.
Similarly, if the assets are unnecessary or an effective reorganization is not possible,
there is no reason to interfere with any action against the guarantor.
101 See, e.g., In re Tracy, 194 F. Supp. 293 (N.D. Cal. 1961).
102 See, e.g., Grundy Nat'l Bank v. Tandem Mining Corp., 754 F.2d 1436, 1440 (4th
Cir. 1985); In re Albany Partners, Ltd., 749 F.2d 670, 673 (11th Cir. 1984); In re A.J.N.
Enters., 464 F. Supp. 394, 395 (E.D. La. 1978) ("the fact that the secured creditor is
adequately protected does not justify an indefinite stay absent some reasonable prospect
that the debtor can be reorganized"). The Supreme Court has described the required
showing as follows:
What this requires is not merely a showing that if there is conceivably to
be an effective reorganization, this property will be needed for it; but that
the property is essential for an effective reorganization that is in prospect.
This means, as many lower courts, including the en banc court in this
case, have properly said, that there must be 'a reasonable possibility of a
successful reorganization within a reasonable time.'
United Sav. Ass'n v. Timbers Inwood Forest Assocs., 108 S. Ct. 626, 632 (1988) (quot-
ing In re Timbers ofInwood Forest Assocs., 808 F.2d 363, 370 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc),
aff'd sub nom. United Sav. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 108 S. Ct. 626
(1988)).
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the court grant an injunction. It is not sufficient that the guarantor
may intend to devote the assets; he must actually do so.
Providing adequate protection, requiring a showing that the
funding is necessary for the reorganization, and requiring a showing
of the likelihood of a successful reorganization reduces the interfer-
ence with the nonbankruptcy interests underlying guaranties. By re-
ducing this interference, the likelihood that any bankruptcy interest
benefitted by a co-debtor stay may outweigh the nonbankruptcy in-
terest increases. Even with such protection, however, enjoining a
creditor from enforcing a guaranty is a severe remedy.
Thus, a court authorizing an interference with a creditor's
rights against a guarantor should make the interference as narrow as
possible 10 3 to further reduce the interference with nonbankruptcy
policies that results from a co-debtor stay. Consequently, any in-
junction should be limited in duration and scope to assure that the
interference is minimal. 10 4 Grounding the co-debtor stay in section
105 assures a court the necessary flexibility to fashion an appropri-
ately limited remedy.
If the court recognizes that although the need for the guaran-
tor's assets to fund a corporate reorganization plan may justify inter-
ference with the enforcement of the guaranty, it does not justify
interference with the creditor's right to obtain a judgment against
the guarantor, then the court can further reduce interference with
the creditor's rights. 10 5 The judgment would enable the creditor to
103 If the creditor had not yet obtained an interest in any of the guarantor's prop-
erty, one might argue that as an unsecured creditor of the guarantor the creditor has no
greater right to the guarantor's property than other creditors and that the guarantor
may transfer property to the debtor corporation without interference by the creditor.
Under this approach, the guarantor may fund the plan and the creditor holding the
guaranty would receive no special treatment in the corporation's plan. However, be-
cause the creditor holding the guaranty has a claim against the guarantor that other
corporate creditors do not have, he has a greater interest in the disposition of the guar-
antor's assets and courts should treat him accordingly. Moreover, any failure to recog-
nize the creditor's right against the guarantor may run into problems under fraudulent
conveyance law. See, UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 4, 7A U.L.A. 474 (1985);
UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT §§ 4, 5, 7A U.L.A. 652 (1985).
104 For example, in In re Otero Mills, Inc., 21 Bankr. 777 (Bankr. D.N.M.), aff'd, 25
Bankr. 1018 (D.N.M. 1982), the court enjoined enforcement of a judgment against a
principal of the debtor on his guaranty but indicated that if the value of the principal's
property on which the creditor held a lien decreased and thereby inadequately protected
the creditor, the creditor could request reconsideration of the injunction. Id at 779-80.
105 In Otero Mills the court enjoined a creditor from executing or otherwise collect-
ing on its judgment against a principal of the debtor who had guaranteed two loans to
the debtor. Id. at 779. The court permitted the creditor to obtain a judgment against
the guarantor and to enter it in the county records, creating a lien against the guaran-
tor's real property. If the debtor needs the guarantor's energy, time, and effort in addi-
tion to his funding to effectuate a successful reorganization, this may provide an
independent basis for staying actions against the guarantor. In that event, the process of
defending the lawsuit might so distract the principal as to interfere with the reorganiza-
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ensure priority to future assets that the guarantor obtains. The
court would stay enforcement of the judgment only as long as the
guarantor's assets are necessary for funding the plan. However, if
the guarantor has other assets, not necessary to fund the reorganiza-
tion plan, those assets should be made available to satisfy the judg-
ment on the guaranty.10 6
The court must protect against guarantors using the corporate
bankruptcy to avoid enforcement of otherwise valid guaranties. If it
is clear that courts will limit any interference with enforcement so
that it does not taint guaranties generally, the benefit to the bank-
ruptcy process may outweigh the interference with the underlying
policies of suretyship law. By assuring the commercial viability of
guaranties, courts can enhance the ability of other debtors to obtain
needed financing.
The seminal case granting an injunction based on the need to
preserve a principal's assets to enable him to finance a reorganiza-
tion plan is In re Otero Mills, Inc. 107 In that case, the debtor sought to
enjoin enforcement of a judgment on a guaranty against its presi-
dent. The debtor contended that the president intended to contrib-
ute personal assets to the debtor's reorganization and that
enforcement of the judgment would lead to a foreclosure sale of
those assets, yielding significantly less for all creditors than an or-
derly property sale in the ordinary course of business.
The court found that section 105 of the Bankruptcy Code em-
powered it to enjoin a creditor's action against a third party "under
appropriate circumstances." 108 In determining whether appropriate
circumstances existed, it applied the test used to determine whether
a preliminary injunction may issue,' 09 requiring the debtor to show:
(1) irreparable harm to the bankruptcy estate if the injunction does
not issue; (2) strong likelihood of success on the merits; and (3) no
harm or minimal harm to the other party or parties. 10 The court
held that, based on the facts before it, an injunction could issue."'I
Interestingly, although the court acknowledged the strict test
tion. If this independent ground exists, it may provide sufficient reason to stay both
litigation and the enforcement of any judgment. See infra Section III(A)(2).
106 See, e.g., In re Otero Mills, 25 Bankr. at 1022 (bankruptcy court should determine
whether enforcement against assets not necessary for plan implementation would harm
debtor).
107 21 Bankr. 777 (Bankr. D.N.M.), aft'd, 25 Bankr. 1018 (D.N.M. 1982).
108 Id. at 778.
109 See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 65. See also H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 6, at 342,
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 6298 (stays of, or injunctions
against, actions excepted from automatic stay by section 362(b) may "be granted or
issued under the usual rules for the issuance of injunctions").




for granting an injunction, it appears to have granted the injunction
on rather thin grounds. The court found irreparable harm based
solely on the debtor's contention that an orderly sale by the guaran-
tor would yield more money than a foreclosure sale by the creditor,
and on the debtor's bare assertion that other creditors would not
cooperate if they believed that one creditor-the creditor holding
the guaranty-was executing on assets earmarked for the satisfac-
tion of all creditor claims. The court made no attempt to determine
the likelihood of success on the merits-which it defined as the
probability of a successful reorganization plan-because the
debtor's plan was not yet due, making it impossible to evaluate this
component of the injunction test. Instead, the court found that the
debtor was entitled to present a plan and that an injunction was
proper at least until the time for filing a plan expired or until the
court denied confirmation of the debtor's plan. Finally, the court
found that the creditor would suffer no harm from an injunction
because the creditor had already transcripted its judgment; there-
fore, the creditor now possessed a lien on the guarantor's real
property and enjoyed adequate protection at least for the next two
months.
The district court ruled on the appeal of the bankruptcy court's
injunction over five months later.'1 2 By that time, the debtor had
apparently filed a reorganization plan that used only a portion of the
president's property to fund the plan; moreover, the period during
which the creditor's protection was found to be sufficient had ex-
pired. Nevertheless, the district court affirmed the injunction and
permitted it to continue, noting that the creditor could always move
for a narrowing or lifting of the injunction if appropriate. 113 The
district court also indicated that even if some of the president's
property was not used to fund a plan, the bankruptcy court should
consider whether "enforcement will affect reorganization by detri-
mentally pressuring the bankrupt."' 14 It thus introduced a new test
of irreparable harm-detrimental pressure on the bankrupt-that a
court could apply even more liberally than the bankruptcy court's
test.
The two opinions in Otero Mills fail to inspire confidence in the
courts' ability to apply the injunctive power narrowly and in only the
clearest cases of significant interference with the debtor's reorgani-
zation. Neither court made any attempt to determine how much of
the president's property was necessary to the reorganization, or
whether the president's contribution was necessary at all. There
112 In re Otero Mills, Inc., 25 Bankr. 1018 (D.N.M. 1982).
''3 Id. at 1022.
114 Id.
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was no evidence on the likelihood that a contribution by the presi-
dent would enable the debtor to reorganize successfully. There was
little evidence that the creditor had adequate protection and that the
protection would continue for the life of the injunction. In essence,
both courts seemed to simply take the debtor's word that the injunc-
tion was necessary.
Both the bankruptcy and district courts indicated that the credi-
tor failed to introduce evidence on the harm to the debtor or to the
creditor. Perhaps these courts meant that they would grant the
debtor's request for an injunction unless the creditor provided some
evidence indicating that the request was unfounded. However, in
view of the serious interference a co-debtor stay poses to the rights
of the creditor, courts should demand more of the debtor before
they issue an injunction, even if the creditor fails to produce suffi-
cient evidence. In other words, the debtor bears the burden of
proving the grounds for an injunction and the creditor's burden of
going forward should not arise until the debtor proves its case.
Although other courts have applied the standards for issuance
of co-debtor stays more strictly than the courts in Otero Mills,'" 5 the
failure to clearly distribute the burdens and to recognize the com-
peting policies involved has resulted in inconsistent outcomes and
unpredictable results.' 16 Thus, a clearer articulation of the policies
involved and more judicious application of the standards for issu-
ance of a co-debtor stay are needed.
2. Interference with Reorganization Efforts
The other common justification for a stay of actions against
guarantors is that the guarantor is a principal whose efforts are nec-
essary for the successful development and implementation of a reor-
ganization plan, and that litigation on the guaranty would interfere
with the guarantor's effort on behalf of the debtor's reorganiza-
tion."l 7 Here the debtor faces a more difficult task. After all, indi-
115 See, e.g., In re Juneau's Builders Center, 57 Bankr. 254 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1986); In
re Kalispell Feed and Grain Supply, 55 Bankr. 627 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1985); In re Philadel-
phia Gold Corp., 56 Bankr. 87 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1985); In re Keyco, Inc., 49 Bankr. 507
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1985).
116 Compare Juneau's Builders, 57 Bankr. 254 (injunction denied; court required show-
ing of undue pressure on debtor) and Philadelphia Gold, 56 Bankr. 87 (denying injunc-
tion) with In re Monroe Well Serv., 67 Bankr. 746 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986) (rejecting
"restrictive" approach of Juneau's Builders and similar cases) and In re Kasual Kreation,
Inc., 54 Bankr. 915 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985) (granting injunction).
117 See, e.g., In re Kasual Kreation, Inc., 54 Bankr. 915 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985); In re
Arrow Huss, Inc., 51 Bankr. 853 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985); cf In re A.H. Robins Co., 828
F.2d 1023 (4th Cir. 1987) (suit against insurer stayed in part because it would subject
debtor's principals to extensive discovery), cert. denied sub nom. Oberg v. Aetna Casualty &
Sur. Co., 56 U.S.L.W. 3648 (U.S. Mar. 21, 1988) (No. 87-1208); A.H. Robins, Co. v.
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viduals always run corporate debtors and the individuals will usually
have a significant role in the formulation and implementation of a
plan. If the mere fact that the creditor is proceeding against a prin-
cipal as guarantor justifies an injunction, creditors could never en-
force their guaranties.
Most courts have recognized the limited nature of this ground
for co-debtor stays. They have required that the debtor or its prin-
cipals show real and potentially severe interference before enjoining
litigation against principals merely because the litigation may divert
their attention from the reorganization. Because this is difficult to
prove, most courts have refused injunctions on this basis.11 8
Those courts that have granted injunctions have strictly limited
their scope and duration. For example, in In re Arrow Huss, Inc. 119
the court enjoined litigation against principals of the debtor where
creditors had filed an involuntary petition less than a month before
the debtor sought an injunction and the principals were still sorting
out the effect of the bankruptcy filing. Even there, however, the
court limited the injunction to forty-five days. 120 The court appar-
ently felt that this sufficed for the principals to get the debtor's af-
fairs in order. Similarly, in In re Johns-Manville Corp. 121 the court
limited its injunction to the period during which the debtor had the
exclusive right to propose a plan, reasoning that during the plan
formulation period the debtor needed the undivided attention and
energy of its key officers and directors. The court also limited the
injunction's protection to twenty-five key employees of the
debtor.122
Most courts considering whether to enjoin actions on guaran-
ties in order to protect key employees have adopted the four-part
test for the issuance of an injunction under Rule 65 of the Federal
Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994 (4th Cir.), (same) cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 251 (1986); In reJohns-
Manville Corp., 26 Bankr. 420 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (tort claimants enjoined from
suing or deposing key officers and directors while plan being formulated), aft'd, 40
Bankr. 219 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd in part on other grounds, 41 Bankr. 926 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
118 In In re Keyco, Inc., 49 Bankr. 507 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1985), the court found that
because the debtor's plan contemplated funding out of operations and did not propose
use of the officers' funds, a state court action against the officers on their guaranties
would not significantly interfere with the debtor's reorganization. That the officers
would divert part of their energy to defense of the state court action was insufficient, by
itself, to justify a stay. To hold otherwise would require that bankruptcy courts always
stay actions against non-debtor principals, a result that the court was unwilling to accept.
Accord, In re Kalispell Feed and Grain Supply, 55 Bankr. 627 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1985).
119 51 Bankr. 853 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985).
120 Id. at 859.
121 26 Bankr. 420 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983), aft'd, 40 Bankr. 219 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd in
part on other grounds, 41 Bankr. 926 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
122 Id. at 426-28.
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Rules of Civil Procedure. 123 Under that test, the moving party must
establish: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits;
(2) that the movant will suffer irreparable injury unless an injunction
issues; (3) that the threatened injury to the movant outweighs any
damage the injunction may cause the opposing party; and (4) that
the injunction would not adversely affect the public interest. 124 Like-
lihood of success on the merits is the probability of an ultimately
successful plan of reorganization. 125 Irreparable harm exists where
a failure to enjoin a creditor would adversely affect, influence, or
pressure the debtor. Whether the injury to the movant outweighs
the damages an injunction may cause requires a balancing of the
harm to the debtor that enforcement of the guaranty imposes
against the harm to the creditor caused by delaying enforcement.
Of course, if the court takes proper measures to protect the credi-
tor's interest, it can decrease the harm to the creditor and tilt the
balance toward a stay.126 When a court considers the public inter-
est, it balances the bankruptcy policies that a stay might further with
the nonbankruptcy policies with which a stay would interfere.
In In re Arrow Huss, Inc. 127 the court listed three relevant consid-
erations in determining whether an injunction is proper:
(1) Whether continuation of the litigation against the
nondebtor would frustrate the ability of the debtor to develop and
go forward with its plan of reorganization.
(2) Whether the debtor is close to having a confirmable plan
that will fully satisfy the affected creditor's claims.
(3) Whether the nondebtors' continuing efforts on behalf of
the debtor are essential to prepare and carry out the provisions of
the plan. 12
8
In Arrow Huss, because the debtor was in the early stages of a "fairly
large" case, the court found that there was sufficient reason to free
the key employees from the burdens of related personal litigation so
they could devote their full energy to running the business and for-
mulating a reorganization plan.' 29 In view of the seriousness of in-
terfering with creditors' rights, however, the court limited the
123 E.g., In re Arrow Huss, Inc., 51 Bankr. 853 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985); In re Anje
Jewelry Co., 47 Bankr. 485 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983); In re Johns-Manville Corp., 33
Bankr. 254 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd 40 Bankr. 219 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); In re Otero
Mills, Inc., 21 Bankr. 777 (Bankr. D.N.M.), aff'd, 25 Bankr. 1018 (D.N.M. 1982).
124 Lundgrin v. Claytor, 619 F.2d 61, 63 (10th Cir. 1980). See also cases cited supra
note 123.
125 Arrow Huss, 51 Bankr. 853.
126 See supra notes 91-99 and accompanying text.
127 51 Bankr. 853 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985).




duration of the injunction to forty-five days.130
Comparing Arrow Huss with In re Keyco 131 highlights the diffi-
culty in seeking a co-debtor stay to avoid interfering with reorgani-
zation efforts. In Keyco the court refused to enjoin a suit against a
principal who was a guarantor of corporate obligations. The court
found that the principal was not funding a reorganization plan and
that any litigation on the guaranty would not adversely affect the
principal's ability to aid the debtor in its reorganization effort.
The difference between Keyco and Arrow Huss appears to be the
stage of the Chapter 11 case at which the debtor sought the injunc-
tion. In Keyco the debtor apparently had been operating in Chapter
11 for some time and had already formulated a plan. Enjoining
creditor action against co-debtors at that time would effectively en-
join such action indefinitely, depriving the creditor of an important,
bargained for right. In Arrow Huss, on the other hand, the debtor
had only recently entered Chapter 11 involuntarily, and was in a dif-
ficult period of adjustment, requiring the undivided attention of its
key employees.
Interestingly, neither Keyco nor Arrow Huss considered whether
some means might exist for protecting the creditor during the effec-
tive period of a co-debtor stay. Perhaps the Arrow Huss court
thought that the short duration of the stay sufficed. But seemingly
an injunction against dissipation of assets by the principal while the
stay is in effect is the minimum protection required, because a per-
son can easily squander assets, even in a period as short as forty-five
days. 132
Perhaps the Keyco court determined that the bankruptcy need
did not justify interference with the nonbankruptcy policies. This
would indicate that even when a court can reduce the interference
with the nonbankruptcy policies, the bankruptcy need must be truly
substantial before it can sanction interference. Because the court's
section 105 power to enjoin is based on the need to protect the re-
organization effort, the court appropriately exercises that power
only when the debtor can clearly show that need.
130 Id.
131 49 Bankr. 507 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1985).
132 One would normally expect that the creditor would affirmatively ask for protec-
tion if a court issues a stay prohibiting the creditor from enforcing its guaranty. See
Bankruptcy Code § 362(d)(1) (Supp. III 1985). The creditor is, however, in an awkward
position. If it asks for protection, it raises the possibility of reducing the adverse effect
on it and on nonbankruptcy policies, thus potentially tipping the balance in favor of the
granting of a stay. Failing to ask for protection may mean, as in Arrow Huss, that it re-
ceives none. Because the court is exercising an equitable power under section 105, it
would be appropriate for the court to raise the adequate protection issue on its own,
even if the creditor has failed to do so.
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Thus, the cases suggest two general reasons for a court to en-
join actions against guarantors of the debtor's obligations. First, if
the guarantor is to help fund a reorganization plan, then a court
should protect his assets from the reach of any particular creditor of
the debtor. A stay is also proper if the guarantor must use his undi-
vided energy and attention to help the debtor through a critical pe-
riod in the reorganization. Most courts agree, however, that an
injunction is not available "simply to 'assist' the debtor in reorganiz-
ing or to relieve general 'pressure' on the debtor." 133 In effect,
then, most courts have at least implicitly recognized that enjoining
enforcement of a guaranty seriously interferes with nonbankruptcy
policies and that a court must limit any such interference to the
clearest cases and even then they must limit the scope of the stay to
minimize any disruption
3 4
133 Arrow Huss, 51 Bankr. at 858 (citing In re A.J. Mackay Co., 50 Bankr. 756 (C.D.
Utah 1985)).
Apparently no court has stayed litigation unrelated to the debtor's reorganization.
Although conceivably a court could stay any litigation against a principal because that
litigation may interfere with his ability to fund or aid the reorganization effort, courts
seem to recognize that personal creditors, as opposed to creditors whose claims arose
out of the debtor's operations, should not be subject to any interference arising from the
debtor's bankruptcy.
134 One other basis for enjoining suits against guarantors involves the guarantors'
right of indemnification that may arise by contract and usually arises under the law of
suretyship. The guarantor may have an absolute right of indemnity against the principal
debtor if the guarantor is called upon to honor the guaranty. If that is so, then success-
ful litigation against the guarantor will, as a practical matter, bind the debtor who will
remain liable to the guarantor regardless of the debtor's liability on the underlying obli-
gation. See, e.g., Seybolt v. Bio-Energy of Lincoln, 38 Bankr. 123 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984);
In re Metal Center, 31 Bankr. 458 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1983); cf A.H. Robins Co. v. Pic-
cinin, 788 F.2d 994 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 251 (1986). In such a situation any
action against the guarantor will have the same effect as an action against the debtor
because the debtor will have a direct interest in the outcome of any litigation. The
debtor will want to participate in the litigation, leading to the same drain on the debtor's
time and resources as if it were a direct action.
An even more direct effect on the debtor may result from litigation against the guar-
antor if courts follow the result in In re M. Frenville Co., 744 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1984),
cert. denied sub nom. Frenville Co. v. Avellino & Bienes, 469 U.S. 1160 (1985). In Frenville
the court held that a non-contractual indemnity claim against the debtor that arose from
litigation instituted after the debtor filed its bankruptcy petition was a post-petition
claim not subject to the automatic stay. In other words, a guarantor who is liable on his
guaranty may be able to sue the debtor free of the section 362 automatic stay and obtain
ajudgment (although he would still be stayed from executing on property of the estate).
A court treating the claim as having arisen post-petition either would permit the guaran-
tor to receive first priority as an administrative claim or would create a nondischargeable
claim in the bankruptcy proceeding. Thus the guarantor would have a better claim to
the debtor's assets than the original creditor! But see, e.g., In re A.H. Robins Co., 63
Bankr. 986 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1986) (claim arose prior to bankruptcy filing and thus stay
applied to claim); In re Edge, 60 Bankr. 690 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1986) (claim arose out
of pre-petition conduct and thus stay prohibited post-petition action). A stay of the
action against the guarantor would protect the debtor from this litigation and liability.
Several courts have rejected the holding of Frenville and have considered the indem-
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B. General Partners of a Debtor Partnership
A partnership is a person under the Bankruptcy Code 35 and is
entitled to file a bankruptcy petition under Chapters 7 or 11.136
Under partnership law, the general partners are liable for partner-
ship debts.13 7 Each partner must contribute any amount necessary
to satisfy the partnership liabilities. 13s Although the partnership
agreement usually governs the allocation of losses among partners,
a creditor is not bound by the agreement and may obtain satisfac-
tion from any of the general partners, leaving them to seek contribu-
tion from the others.' 3 9 The right of the partnership itself to seek
from individual partners contributions towards losses140 becomes
property of the estate under section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code,14
and the bankruptcy trustee may enforce the right.
nity claim as a pre-petition claim subject to the automatic stay as long as all of the events
underlying the claim occurred prepetition. See, e.g., In re Johns-Manville Corp., 57
Bankr. 680 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986); In re Baldwin-United Corp., 48 Bankr. 901 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 1985). These courts give effect to the broadened definition of claim in the
bankruptcy code which is a "right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to
judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed,
undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured." Bankruptcy Code § 101(4) (1982
& Supp. III 1985). Courts that have adopted this view are on surer footing in view of the
Congressional intent to deal with "all legal obligations of the debtor, no matter how
remote or contingent". H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 6, at 309, reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 6266.
In any event, it appears that Frenville would only apply to noncontractual indemnity
claims. Where the principal debtor contractually obligated itself prior to the petition to
indemnify the guarantor, the guarantor's claim is a prepetition claim subject to the auto-
matic stay.
When a colorable basis exists for contesting the creditor's claim, it may entitle the
debtor to a stay of the litigation against the guarantor. A court could base the stay on
the identity of interest between the debtor and the guarantor, and the need of the
debtor to protect its interest by intervening in the suit against the guarantor. In most
cases this issue will not arise because there will be little question that the debtor has
defaulted under the loan agreement, particularly if bankruptcy is an act of default. Only
in the exceptional case in which the debtor's liability is unclear will a basis exist for
enjoining litigation against the guarantor.
135 Bankruptcy Code § 101(35) (West Supp. 1987).
136 Bankruptcy Code § 109(b),(d) (Supp. III 1985). Partnerships that fall within the
definition of "family farmer" in section 101(17)(B) may file under Chapter 12. Bank-
ruptcy Code § 109(f). In addition, creditors may file an involuntary petition against a
partnership under Chapter 7 or 11. Bankruptcy Code § 303(a) (West Supp. 1987).
137 UNIF. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 15, 6 U.L.A. 174 (1914).
138 Id. §§ 18(a), 40(d), 6 U.L.A. 213, 469.
139 Id. See generally A. BROMBERG, CRANE AND BROMBERG ON PARTNERSHIP 335-36
(1968). In general, the partners are jointly liable for most obligations and jointly and
severally liable for certain tort obligations. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 15, 6 U.L.A. 174
(1914). In mostjurisdictions,joint liability means that all partners subject to jurisdiction
must be joined in an action on the debt. Nevertheless, each partner is liable for the
entire obligation. A. BROMBERG, supra, at 335-36.
140 UNIF. PARTNERSHIP Aar § 18(a), 6 U.L.A. 213 (1914).
141 Bankruptcy Code § 541(a) (Supp. III 1985). See Rosenberg, supra note 55, at
1189.
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In a liquidation case, section 723 of the Bankruptcy Code reit-
erates that the trustee of a debtor partnership has a claim against
the general partners for any deficiency of partnership assets to pay
claims against the partnership.' 42 That claim has equal priority with
claims of individual creditors of the partners.' 43 Thus, the trustee
has an interest in protecting the assets of general partners in order
to assure their availability for the satisfaction of the partnership
obligations.
Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, section 5 detailed proce-
dural rules for enforcing the individual partners' liabilities for part-
nership obligations. 144 As under the Bankruptcy Code, the right to
recover from individual partners derived from state partnership law
and was, under section 70(a), property that passed to the trustee. 145
In construing section 5, the Supreme Court held that the trustee of
a partnership could administer the property of nonbankrupt part-
142 Bankruptcy Code § 723 (Supp. III 1985). The trustee must, to the extent practi-
cable, first try to recover from general partners who are not debtors under title 11.
Bankruptcy Code § 723(b) (Supp. III 1985). The court may, while it is determining the
deficiency, require indemnity or an assurance of payment from any such partners, or it
may order the partner not to dispose of property. Id. The trustee has a claim against
the estate of any general partner who is in bankruptcy for the full amount of the claims
of creditors allowed in the partnership case. However, the creditors of the bankrupt
partnership do not themselves have claims against an individual partner in bankruptcy
unless their claims are secured solely by property of the individual partner. Bankruptcy
Code § 723(c) (Supp. III 1985). The legislative history explains the operation of section
723(c) as follows:
Subsection (c) requires the partnership trustee to seek recovery of the full
amount of the deficiency from the estate of each general partner that is a
debtor in a bankruptcy case. The trustee will share equally with the part-
ners' individual creditors in the assets of the partners' estates. Claims of
partnership creditors who may have filed against the partner will be disal-
lowed to avoid double counting.
H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 6, at 381, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 6337; S. REP. No. 989, supra note 6, at 95, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 5881. If the recovery from bankrupt general partners' estates is greater
than the deficiency that the trustee sought to recover, "the court is required to deter-
mine an equitable redistribution of the surplus to the estate of the general partners." Id.
143 This overturns the so-called "jingle rule" of the prior Bankruptcy Act. That rule
permitted creditors of individual partners to recover their claims from the partners' indi-
vidual estates before partnership creditors could assert their claims against the individ-
ual partners. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 5(g), 30 Stat. 544, 548 (1898) (formerly
codified at 11 U.S.C. § 23 (1976)), repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-598, § 401(a), 92 Stat. 2549, 2682 (1978). See generally H.R. REP. No. 595, supra
note 6, at 381, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 6337; S. REP. No.
989, supra note 6, at 95, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 5881; 4
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY (15th ed.), supra note 15, 723.04[3].
144 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 5, 30 Stat. 544, 547-48 (1898) (formerly codi-
fied at I1 U.S.C. § 23 (1976)), repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-598, § 401(a), 92 Stat. 2549, 2682 (1978).
145 Id. § 70(a), 30 Stat. 544, 565-66 (formerly codified at 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (1976)),
repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 40 1(a), 92 Stat. 2549,
2682 (1978).
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ners as part of the administration of the partnership estate. 146
Although the trustee did not have the benefit of the extraordinary
bankruptcy avoidance powers, 14 7 the effect of this joint administra-
tion was to deprive a partner of control over his property without
granting him the discharge that is normally the benefit that follows
the deprivation. 148 A corollary of the joint administration of assets
was that the bankruptcy court, pursuant to its general equitable
powers, could aid the administration of the partners' estates by en-
joining them from disposing of property and enjoining third parties
from interfering with the partners' property. 149
There are two classes of potential competing claimants for indi-
vidual partners' property: creditors of the partnership enforcing the
unlimited liability of general partners, and creditors of the individ-
ual partners. Under the prior Bankruptcy Act, 150 and under the
Uniform Partnership Act,15 1 when a court was administering the as-
sets of the partnership and of individual partners, creditors of the
partnership had priority to the partnership assets and creditors of
the individual partners had priority to the partners' assets. Thus, if
the court were to enforce these rules, the court needed the power to
146 Francis v. McNeal, 228 U.S. 695 (1913). Bankruptcy rule 108(c) permitted the
court to order partners to file schedules of assets and liabilities. FED. R. BANKR. P.
108(c), 11 U.S.C. app. 108(c) (1976). This was in part to enable the trustee to exercise
this power to administer partners' assets. Bankruptcy rule 10 0 7 (g) now authorizes the
court to order individual partners to file statements of personal assets and liabilities.
FED. R. BANKR. P. 100 7 (g). Although the Bankruptcy Code no longer authorizes the
trustee to administer the assets of individual partners, the schedules would enable the
trustee to determine whether to exercise the partnership's right to pursue partners' as-
sets. In a reorganization case, the schedules may be necessary to enable the court to
determine whether a plan meets the "best interest of creditors" test. If the partners
possess a sufficiently large excess of assets over liabilities, the partnership's plan may
have to provide for 100% payment in order to assure that creditors receive at least the
amount that they would have received upon liquidation of the partnership. See generally
Rosenberg, supra note 55.
147 Liberty Nat'l Bank v. Bear, 276 U.S. 215, 224-26 (1928). Under the Bankruptcy
Act, these powers included the power to avoid preferences (section 60), fraudulent con-
veyances (section 67(d)), certain statutory liens (section 67(c)), certain setoffs (section
68), transfers and transactions avoidable by actual creditors (section 70(e)), and transac-
tions and transfers avoidable by a judicial lien creditor who extended credit and ob-
tained a lien on the date of bankruptcy (section 70(c)).
148 Rosenberg, supra note 55, at 1180-81. Interestingly, because the partners would
not be subject to the bankruptcy law, the jingle rule, which required using the partners'
assets to satisfy their individual creditors first, would be inapplicable in the administra-
tion. By keeping the partners out of formal bankruptcy proceedings, the partnership
creditors could receive prior right to the individual assets. Id. at 1183 n. 52.
149 Id. at 1184. See, e.g., In re Jercyn Dress Shop, 516 F.2d 864 (2d Cir. 1975).
150 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 5, 30 Stat. 544, 547-48 (1898) (formerly codi-
fied at 11 U.S.C. § 23 (1976)), repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-598, § 401(a), 92 Stat. 2549, 2682.
151 UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 40(h), 6 U.L.A. 469 (1914).
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stay actions by partnership creditors against individual partners as
well as actions against the partnership itself.
Under the Bankruptcy Code, neither the trustee of the partner-
ship nor any of the partners' creditors has priority to the partners'
assets.' 52 Thus, no need exists for the trustee to assure that part-
nership creditors do not reach the assets of a partner before the
individual creditors of that partner. This may suggest, therefore,
that the trustee should have no power to interfere with partnership
creditors' actions against partners if the partners themselves are not
in bankruptcy and the trustee is not administering their estates.
However, section 723 of the current Code grants the court the
extraordinary power to order any partner who is not a debtor under
title 11 "to provide the estate with indemnity for, or assurance of
payment of, any deficiency recoverable from such partner, or not to
dispose of property." 153 Although the language does not directly
say so, its spirit implies that the court can take those actions it deems
necessary to protect a partner's property. 154 Coupled with section
105, this could permit an injunction barring partnership creditors
from enforcing their claims against partners' property as well as an
injunction barring the partner from voluntarily transferring the
property. 1
55
152 "This section is a significant departure from present law. It repeals the jingle
rule, which, for ease of administration, denied partnership creditors their rights against
general partners by permitting general partners' individual creditors to share in their
estates first to the exclusion of partnership creditors." H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 6,
at 381, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 6337. It is unclear whether
the jingle rule is repealed in a Chapter 11 case. Rosenberg, supra note 55, at 1199.
153 Bankruptcy Code § 723(b) (1982). Bankruptcy Rule 1007(g) (1987) authorizes
the court to require general partners to file schedules of assets and liabilities to provide
the trustee with information necessary to determine what action must be taken.
154 The House report stated that
[u]nder 11 U.S.C. 723(b) the court is empowered to order any such part-
ner to provide assurance that the partnership's estate will be paid.
Thus the court may use 11 U.S.C. 105 to enjoin creditors of the part-
ner from levying on the partners property or from obtaining liens
thereon. This may need to be done because the judicial lien of the part-
nership's trustee under 11 U.S.C. 544(a) does not extend to property of
the partners.
H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 6, at 199-200, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws at 6160.
155 Arguably, partnership creditors might be automatically stayed under section 362
from taking action against individual partners. The trustee of the partnership, as repre-
sentative of the creditors, has a chose in action against the partners that is property of
the estate. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT §§ 18a, 40, 6 U.L.A. 469 (1914); Bankruptcy Code
§ 541 (a). The Bankruptcy Code stays "any act to obtain possession of property of the
estate." Id. § 362(a)(3). If the trustee's action encompasses the actions of partnership
creditors, then actions directly by the creditors interfere with the trustee's control over
property of the estate, i.e., the chose in action. Cf In re S.I. Acquisition, Inc., 817 F.2d
1142 (5th Cir. 1987) ("alter ego" action by creditor stayed because under Texas law
action belongs to debtor); Delgado Oil Co. v. Torres, 785 F.2d 857 (10th Cir. 1986)
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On the other hand, the Bankruptcy Code eliminated the admin-
istration of a nonbankrupt partner's estate when the partnership is
in bankruptcy. 156 Instead, the trustee of the partnership has, as
under state law, 15 7 a chose in action against the partner to recover
any deficiency in partnership assets.158 By eliminating the adminis-
tration of nonbankrupt partners' estates, it may seem that Congress
intended to eliminate as well the power of the bankruptcy court to
enjoin actions by third parties against property of the individual
partners. Indeed, the explicit statutory grant of power to the court
to order partners not to dispose of their property pending determi-
nation of any deficiency supports this. 159 After all, having codified
part of the bankruptcy court's earlier power under the Act, if Con-
gress intended the court to enjoin third party actions against part-
ners' property it could have explicitly said so.
Nevertheless, when partnership creditors are seeking to enforce
the unlimited liability of general partners, the trustee is often justi-
fied in asking a court to enjoin direct actions against individual part-
ners until the partnership estate is settled. The partnership trustee
represents all of the partnership creditors. The trustee has an ac-
tion against the partners to recover the deficiency in partnership as-
sets160 and must distribute the recovery to creditors in accordance
(shareholder's derivative action stayed because action is property of estate of corporate
debtor). But see In re Ozark Restaurant Equip. Co., 816 F.2d 1222 (8th Cir.) ("alter ego"
action not stayed when, under Arkansas law, action does not belong to debtor and in-
stead is personal to creditors), cert. denied sub nom. Jacoway v. Anderson, 108 S. Ct. 147
(1987). Creditors might also be automatically stayed if their actions are considered so
closely related to the trustee's action as to constitute property of the estate. Cf A.H.
Robins Co. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 251 (1986).
However, it appears that the trustee's chose in action is separate from partnership
creditors' actions. The trustee's action is brought under sections 18(a) and 40 of the
Uniform Partnership Act. Partners are jointly liable to the partnership for any deficiency
in the partnership's assets, but if fewer than all of the partners are solvent and subject to
jurisdiction, the available partners are liable for the full deficiency. Partners are liable to
partnership creditors, as opposed to the partnership, under section 15 of the Uniform
Partnership Act. Liability is joint and several with respect to many tort claims and joint
with respect to other claims. Unlike "alter ego" actions or shareholder derivative suits,
in which only one cause of action exists, the partners are liable under two separate
causes of action. Thus, although creditors are stayed from asserting the partnership's
claim, they are probably not stayed from asserting their own section 15 claims against
individual partners.
156 Rosenberg, supra note 55, at 1189. See also 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY (15th ed.),
supra note 15, 723.02.
157 UNIF. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 40, 6 U.L.A. 469 (1914).
158 Bankruptcy Code § 723(a) (Supp. III 1985).
159 Bankruptcy Code § 723(b) (1982) ("Pending determination of such deficiency,
the court may order any such partner to provide the estate with indemnity for, or assur-
ance of payment of, any deficiency recoverable from such partner, or not to dispose of
property.").
160 Bankruptcy Code § 723(a) (Supp. III 1985).
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with the priority rules of sections 507 and 726.161 Unlike the volun-
tary contribution that a guarantor might make to a reorganization
effort, which is not property of the estate until it is made, the trustee
may enforce the partners' obligations as property of the estate.
If the general partner from whom the trustee seeks recovery is
solvent (i.e., the value of his assets equals or exceeds his total part-
nership and individual liability), then an action by the partnership
creditor against the partner is unobjectionable. By definition, the
assets will suffice to satisfy both the partnership and the individual
creditors.
If the partner is insolvent, however, courts should not allow
partnership creditors to circumvent the Bankruptcy Code's priority
scheme by racing to the general partners while the partnership is in
bankruptcy. 162 By directly reaching the assets of individual partners
before the trustee can recover them, partnership creditors could re-
move themselves from the bankruptcy distribution and "grab" as-
sets that would otherwise have gone into the debtor partnership's
estate for distribution to creditors generally.
Thus, a stay of actions against individual partners may at times
be necessary to protect the trustee's rights while the trustee ad-
ministers the partnership estate. In In re Comark 163 the court seems
to have recognized some of these issues when it enjoined a partner-
ship creditor from enforcing a judgment against two general part-
ners of the bankrupt partnership. The court found that if it
permitted the creditor to act prior to the partnership trustee's at-
tempt to determine and collect the deficiency from the general part-
ners, the creditor would receive preference over other partnership
creditors and would precipitate a "race to the courthouse" by the
other partnership creditors. 164 This would defeat the bankruptcy
goal of equitably distributing a debtor's assets among its creditors.
On the other hand, in In re Aboussie Bros. Construction Co. 165 the
court refused to enjoin actions against individual partners who had
guaranteed partnership debts. Focusing on the entity theory of
partnership law, the court held that there was no basis for disregard-
ing the separate existence of the partners from the partnership, and,
161 Bankruptcy Code §§ 507, 726 (West 1979 & Supp. 1987).
162 Of course, the other creditors can protect themselves by instituting involuntary
proceedings against the insolvent partner. See, Bankruptcy Code § 303 (West 1979 &
Supp. 1987). Similarly, the partnership trustee may be a petitioning creditor. See, Ken-
nedy, Partnership and Partners Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act and the New (Proposed) Bank-
ruptcy Rules, 27 ST. Louis U.L.J. 507, 534-35 (1983). Even if the trustee does file an
involuntary petition, he will generally need two other petitioners. Id. Thus, an injunc-
tion may most effectively protect the estate.
163 53 Bankr. 945 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1985).
164 Id. at 947.
165 8 Bankr. 302 (E.D. Mo. 1981).
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therefore, no basis for a co-debtor stay.166 Unlike Comark, however,
the partners in Aboussie failed to argue that a stay was necessary to
protect their assets in order to enable them to cover any deficiency
in partnership assets. Instead, the partners asserted grounds similar
to those of guarantors seeking stays-that they might have to fund a
reorganization of the partnership and that their undivided time and
energy were necessary to further the reorganization effort. In effect,
then, the Aboussie court may simply have decided that the partners'
traditional guarantor arguments did not justify a co-debtor stay.
Another important difference between Aboussie and Comark is
that while Comark was a Chapter 7 case, Aboussie involved a Chapter
11 debtor. In a Chapter 11 case, the issues concerning a stay of
actions against individual partners differ from those in Chapter 7.
First, section 723 does not apply in Chapter 11.167 Thus, the ex-
press authorization to order individual partners to preserve their
property does not apply in Chapter 11.
In addition, a Chapter 11 case normally envisions the continua-
tion of the business with payment of debts out of the future income
of the reorganized entity. Thus, problems of distributing scarce
partnership assets upon liquidation should not normally arise. 168
Nevertheless, if the debtor proposes a liquidation plan in Chapter
11 a need may exist to preserve individual partners' assets for distri-
bution under the plan. Moreover, because a court must determine
prior to confirming a plan that the plan comports with the "best
interest of creditors" test, 169 the court will in any event have to de-
termine the amount that creditors could have recovered from gen-
eral partners in a liquidation. The court must, therefore, have
information about partners' assets and liabilities even if those assets
are not to be used to satisfy the claims of partnership creditors.
170
Yet even in a Chapter 11 partnership reorganization in which
the business continues to operate, some co-debtor stay issues may
arise. These are similar to the issues that arise in guarantor cases in
Chapter 11. For example, the general partners may plan to finance
a reorganized partnership. In that case, the same reasoning that
may, in appropriate circumstances, justify co-debtor stays to protect
guarantors and their assets for the benefit of all of the creditors ap-
plies to the partners. Indeed, the justification for a stay is greater
here than in the guarantor cases, because none of the partnership
166 Id. at 303-04.
167 Bankruptcy Code § 103 (1982).
168 Rosenberg, supra note 55, at 1200. A debtor may propose a liquidation plan in
Chapter 11, in which case similar distribution questions may arise.
169 Bankruptcy Code § 1129(a)(7) (West Supp. 1987).
170 See Bankruptcy Rule 10 07 (g) (1982).
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creditors ex ante has any greater right to the individual partners' as-
sets than the others. Thus the problem of depriving a creditor with
foresight of the advantage he had obtained at the time of con-
tracting does not arise.'
71
Similarly, the partners may constitute the key personnel operat-
ing the partnership and formulating a reorganization plan. As in the
case of key-personnel guarantors, a court must consider this basis
for a stay with care, but a limited stay may, in the long run, increase
the recovery of partnership creditors generally.
In partnership cases, the bankruptcy policies a co-debtor stay
may implicate include, as in guarantor cases, the need to support
the reorganization effort. In addition, however, the policy of equita-
ble distribution of a debtor's assets, including the partnership's
claim against individual partners, becomes important as well.
In partnership cases, unlike the guarantor cases, the partners
have, in effect, guaranteed all of the partnership obligations. There
is no issue of enforcing the security obtained by one foresightful
creditor to the possible detriment of other creditors. Instead, be-
cause all creditors are entitled to the benefit of the partners' liabil-
ity, the issue becomes one of equitably distributing amounts that
can be obtained from the partners.
The nonbankruptcy interest with which a stay would interfere is
the expectation that partners will have unlimited liability for the
debts of the partnership and that creditors of the partnership can
reach the assets of an individual partner. In effect, partnership law
renders the partners guarantors of the partnership obligations, and
creditors presumably rely on that "guaranty" in extending credit to
the partnership. If a court interferes with the enforcement of the
partners' separate liability, then credit availability may decrease or
credit may become more expensive to partnerships generally. In ef-
fect, the benefits of the partnership form of business entity-a sepa-
rate entity functioning apart from the individual partners but which
offers creditors the security of the partners' assets-may be lost.
In a liquidation case, any co-debtor stay will interfere minimally
with these nonbankruptcy policies if the trustee, as representative of
all of the partnership creditors, diligently pursues the partnership's
claims against the individual partners for contributions to satisfy the
partnership's obligations. In that case, the trustee may reach the
partners' assets promptly, and the threat of dissipation or of com-
171 A partnership creditor may have had the foresight to have individual partners
guarantee the partnership obligation. See UNIF. PARTNERSHiP ACT § 15(b), 6 U.L.A. 174
(1914); In re Comark, 53 Bankr. 945 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1985); A. BROMBERG, supra note




peting claims to those assets does not differ from the threat that
partnership creditors would face if they pursued the partners them-
selves. Thus, as long as the trustee acts diligently, bankruptcy may
be viewed as preventing the race by partnership creditors to both
partnership and individual assets. In that event, the trustee's dili-
gence should protect the creditors' interests; the ,only detriment to
creditors will be the requirement that they share the fruits of the
trustee's efforts with other partnership creditors.
In Chapter 11, however, diligent pursuit of the partnership's
claims against partners is less likely than in Chapter 7.172 In Chap-
ter 11, the debtor normally remains in possession and serves as
trustee. 173 In essence, the partners continue to run the partnership,
and they presumably have little interest in pursuing themselves. If
the partners can convincingly show that they are contributing assets
to the reorganization effort, then a court should stay actions by part-
nership creditors against the partners to the extent that those ac-
tions would interfere with the contributions. This would further the
bankruptcy policy of supporting the reorganization effort. Such a
stay would only minimally interfere with nonbankruptcy policies be-
cause the assets that creditors would have reached are in fact going
into the partnership where they will be available to the creditors.
If the partners contribute nothing to the reorganization effort,
however, there is little reason to stay partnership creditors from
pursuing individual partners. As in the guarantor cases, a court may
sometimes appropriately grant a very brief stay to enable the part-
ners to formulate a reorganization plan. Beyond that, however, be-
cause there is no one to pursue the partners on behalf of all of the
creditors, and because enforcement of that nonbankruptcy right
would not interfere with the bankruptcy case, a stay should not issue
and creditors should freely pursue their nonbankruptcy remedies
against partners who are not themselves in bankruptcy.
Even less justification exists for enjoining actions against part-
ners by individual creditors of the partners. The partnership trustee
has no greater rights than the individual partners' creditors to assets
of the partners. 74 Moreover, the trustee does not represent those
creditors, who have no connection to the partnership or its bank-
172 One commentator has stated, "Research has uncovered no reported cases in
which a debtor in possession or trustee in a rehabilitation case has.., asserted a chose
in action ... to obtain partners' assets to contribute to a partnership reorganization
plan." Rosenberg, supra note 55, at 1199.
173 Bankruptcy Code § 1107 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
174 In fact, it is unclear whether the jingle rule has been repealed in Chapter 11
cases. See supra note 152. If it has not been repealed, there is even less reason to enjoin
nonpartnership creditors from pursuing actions against partners. See Rosenberg, supra
note 55, at 1199.
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ruptcy. Thus, the bankruptcy of the partnership should not affect
the rights of the partners' individual creditors to pursue their debt-
ors. In effect, these rights, unrelated to the partnership, are similar
to the unrelated actions against guarantors, actions a court should
not usually stay in any event. Moreover, a refusal to stay actions
unrelated to the partnership furthers the Bankruptcy Code's policy
of not imposing bankruptcy administration of the estates of partners
who are not in bankruptcy.
C. Tax Claims
The Internal Revenue Code requires employers to withhold
from their employees' wages social security and income taxes 175 and
to hold those taxes in trust for the government. 176 Because the gov-
ernment must credit the employee for withheld taxes even if the em-
ployer fails to remit these "trust fund" taxes to the government, 17
7
the Internal Revenue Code permits the government to collect the
taxes from those persons responsible for an employer's failure to
remit the withheld taxes.1
78
When a company suffers financial difficulty, it is not unusual for
the company to defer its payments of these trust fund taxes in order
to reserve cash for more pressing obligations. 1'79 Typically, manage-
ment hopes that if it can survive its short term difficulties it can re-
turn to profitability. When management fails to realize its optimistic
projections, however, the Internal Revenue Service will pursue "re-
sponsible officers and employees of the corporation" for the "trust
fund" taxes the employer owes.180
If the employer is in a bankruptcy proceeding when the Internal
Revenue Service seeks to collect from responsible individuals, 18 1 the
individuals, typically principals of the employer, may seek to enjoin
175 I.R.C. §§ 3102, 3402 (West 1979 & Supp. 1987).
176 I.R.C. § 7501(a) (1982).
177 See, e.g., United States v. Huckabee Auto Co., 783 F.2d 1546, 1548 (11th Cir.
1986) (per curiam); Grasso v. Oehmann, 54 A.2d 570 (D.C. 1947).
178 Any person required to collect, truthfully account for, and pay over any
tax imposed by this title who willfully fails to collect such tax, or truthfully
account for and pay over such tax, or willfully attempts in any manner to
evade or defeat any such tax or the payment thereof, shall, in addition to
other penalties provided by law, be liable to a penalty equal to the total
amount of the tax evaded, or not collected, or not accounted for and paid
over.
I.R.C. § 6672(a) (1982).
179 E.g., Slodov v. United States, 436 U.S. 238, 243 (1978).
180 I.R.S. Policy Statement P-5-60 (May 30, 1984) (I.R. Manual MT 1218-157), re-
printed in 8A Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 1 5569.01 (1986).
181 The Internal Revenue Service has indicated that it will seek to collect from re-
sponsible persons under I.R.C. § 6672(a) whenever it cannot immediately collect the
taxes from the corporation. I.R.S. Policy Statement P-5-60, supra note 180, reprinted in
8A Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) at 5569.01.
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the collection effort. They may seek an injunction because their ef-
forts are necessary for a successful reorganization, because they are
providing funding to the debtor, or because the debtor's reorgani-
zation plan provides for payment of the "trust fund" taxes.
Enjoining the Internal Revenue Service from collecting "trust
fund" taxes raises several issues, some similar to those in the guar-
antor cases and some unique. One initial question is whether the
bankruptcy court has jurisdiction over a dispute between the Inter-
nal Revenue Service and a nondebtor principal, and another is
whether the debtor has standing to seek an injunction to protect a
nondebtor principal.
Courts are split on the question of the bankruptcy court's juris-
diction to hear the issue.182 By statute, "[b]ankruptcy judges may
hear and determine ... all core proceedings arising under title 11,
or arising in a case under title 11 .... and may enter appropriate
orders and judgments." 183 Core proceedings include "(A) matters
concerning the administration of the estate; . . . (B) allowance or
disallowance of claims against the estate; . . . [and] (0) other pro-
ceedings affecting ... the adjustment of the debtor-creditor or the
equity security holder relationship."'
184
Section 505 of the Bankruptcy Code directly authorizes the
bankruptcy court to "determine the amount or legality of any tax,
any fine or penalty relating to a tax."'185 Because the imposition of
liability on responsible persons is a tax penalty, 186 some courts have
based their jurisdiction to enjoin collection on section 505.187 After
all, these courts observe, the tax penalty derives from the operations
of the debtor and the debtor's tax liability. Moreover, in many cases
the debtor will have indemnified its responsible persons. Ulti-
182 Compare In re Campbell Enters., 66 Bankr. 200 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1986) (finding
bankruptcy court jurisdiction); and In reJ.K. Printing Servs., 49 Bankr. 798 (Bankr. W.D.
Va. 1985) (same) and In re Original Wild West Foods, Inc., 45 Bankr. 202 (Bankr. W.D.
Tex. 1984) (same) and In re Precision Colors, 36 Bankr. 429 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1984)
(same) and In re Datair Sys. Corp., 37 Bankr. 690 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1983) (same) and In re
Jon Co., 30 Bankr. 831 (D. Colo. 1983) (same) and In re H & R Ice Co., 24 Bankr. 28
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1982) (same) with United States v. Huckabee Auto Co., 783 F.2d 1546
(11 th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (finding that bankruptcy court lacks jurisdiction) and In re
Pressimone, 39 Bankr. 240 (N.D.N.Y. 1984) (same) and United States v. Rayson Sports,
44 Bankr. 280 (N.D. Il1. 1984) (same). See generally Note, Bankruptcy Court Jurisdiction and
the Power to Enjoin the IRS, 70 MINN. L. REv. 1279, 1281-94 (1986) (authored by Deborah
Dyson).
183 28 U.S.C.A. § 157(b)(1) (West Supp. 1987).
184 Id. § 157(b)(2).
185 Bankruptcy Code § 505(a)(1) (1982).
186 I.R.C. § 6672 (1982). But see United States v. Sotelo, 436 U.S. 268 (1978)
(although denominated a "penalty" under Internal Revenue Code, liability is in nature
of a tax, at least for purposes of determining dischargeability).
187 E.g., In re H & R Ice Co., 24 Bankr. 28 (Bankr. W.D. Md. 1982).
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mately, therefore, the tax liability will fall on the debtor, even if it is
initially imposed on the responsible persons. 188
Other courts, however, have maintained that section 505 ap-
plies only to taxes the government imposes directly on the
debtor.1 89 These courts point out that unlike, for example, the
guarantor's liability, which derives from the principal's liability, the
liability of responsible persons under the Internal Revenue Code is
separate from the employer's liability.19 0 Therefore, unless the re-
sponsible persons choose to submit themselves to the jurisdiction of
the bankruptcy court by filing their own bankruptcy petitions, they
should not fall under the protection of section 505.
The Bankruptcy Code seeks to resolve claims against a debtor.
The Code does not give the court jurisdiction to determine claims
against third parties, even if those claims have some relationship to
the debtor. Therefore, the section 505 authority to determine the
amount or legality of a tax must encompass the debtor's tax liability
rather than the liability of any third party. Indeed, the legislative
history indicates that "[s]ubsections (a) and (b) ... permit determi-
nation by the bankruptcy court of any unpaid tax liability of the
debtor." 191 Thus, section 505 does not authorize the bankruptcy
court to determine the liability of responsible persons or to enjoin
collection of any tax penalty imposed on such persons.
Yet even if section 505 does not cover the liability of responsi-
ble persons, arguably the bankruptcy court still has jurisdiction to
enjoin collection of any tax penalty imposed on such persons.' 92
This jurisdiction arises from the section 105 authorization to "issue
any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to
188 Even if an indemnity agreement exists, however, the bankruptcy court would
have the power to determine whether indemnity is proper. Moreover, the section 362
automatic stay would prevent the responsible persons from enforcing the agreement
during the pendency of the bankruptcy case. But see In re M. Frenville Co., 744 F.2d 332
(3d Cir. 1984) (indemnity claim may be post-petition obligation), cert. denied sub nom.
Frenville Co. v. Avellino & Bienes, 469 U.S. 1160 (1985).
189 See, e.g., United States v. Huckabee Auto Co., 783 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir. 1986)
(per curiam); In re Success Tool and Mfg. Co., 62 Bankr. 221 (N.D. Ill. 1986); In re Pierce
Coal and Constr., 49 Bankr. 779 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. 1985).
190 Huckabee Auto, 783 F.2d 1546. Although the Internal Revenue Service has a pol-
icy of collecting the tax only once, technically it has the power to impose the penalty on
the responsible persons and collect the tax from the debtor as well. In re Huckabee Auto
Co., 46 Bankr. 741 (M.D. Ga. 1985), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Huckabee Auto Co.,
783 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam).
191 H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 6, at 356, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws at 6312 (emphasis added).
192 One commentator has argued that § 505 deserves a "nonliteral reading" in or-
der to bring these suits within the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court. Note, supra note
182, at 1305-07. While I agree with the result, I do not believe courts can ground juris-
diction on that section. Ample authority elsewhere in the Bankruptcy Code enables the
bankruptcy court to protect the debtor's reorganization effort.
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carry out the provisions of this title." 9 3 This situation does not dif-
fer significantly from other co-debtor stay cases in which creditors'
actions against a principal of the debtor may interfere with the
debtor's reorganization. Thus, the broadened jurisdiction of the
bankruptcy court should suffice to enable it to consider the issue.194
Although the Internal Revenue Code views the liability of the
responsible person as legally separate from that of the debtor, such
a legal nicety cannot change the fact that the claim against the re-
sponsible person arose as a result of the activities of the debtor.
Moreover, the Internal Revenue Service is a creditor of the debtor.
Enforcement of the penalty has a direct impact on the estate be-
cause it may pressure the debtor to pay the IRS quickly in order to
protect the principals. 195 Moreover, a significant drain on the prin-
cipals' energies and assets may occur that could adversely affect the
reorganization effort. Thus, because of the significant impact direct
actions by the IRS will have, the bankruptcy court has jurisdiction to
consider the controversy.
Resolving the question of standing in the tax context does not
significantly differ from the general corporate guarantor context.
The debtor will have standing if it "has '"alleged such a personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy' " as to warrant his invoca-
tion of federal court jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court's
remedial power on his behalf."' 196 As in the guarantor cases, if the
debtor shows that the collection effort will substantially and ad-
versely affect it and jeopardize its reorganization, it will have stand-
ing to seek an injunction.
197
As in the guarantor cases, however, the substantial and adverse
impact must be on the debtor, not on the principal whom the debtor
is seeking to protect. Thus, a more difficult standing issue arises if
the debtor seeks a stay simply because the debtor's plan proposes
payment of the tax obligation and the principal wants to avoid per-
sonal liability.' 98 If that is all the harm the debtor can assert, then
'93 Bankruptcy Code § 105(a) (West Supp. 1987).
194 See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
195 Cf Note, The Availability of Injunctions in Bankruptcy to Restrain Collection of LR.C.
§ 6672(a) Penalties, 7 CARDOZO L. REv. 613, 636-38 (1986) (authored by Beth Neelman)
(discussing fiduciary obligation of officers).
196 In re Original Wild West Foods, Inc., 45 Bankr. 202, 205 (Bankr. W.D. Tex.
1984) (quoting Simon v. Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976) (quoting
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975))).
197 Id.
198 In order for a plan to be confirmed it must provide for full payment of priority
tax claims, although payment may be in "deferred cash payments, over a period not
exceeding six years after the date of assessment of such claim, of a value, as of the effec-
tive date of the plan, equal to the allowed amount of such claim." Bankruptcy Code
§ 1129(a)(9)(C) (West 1979). The Bankruptcy Code grants priority for "allowed un-
secured claims of governmental units, only to the extent that such claims are for-..
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the action against the principal will not adversely affect the debtor
and the debtor may not have standing to challenge the assessment.
Standing exists only when the action will in some meaningful way
interfere with the reorganization.
Even if the bankruptcy court has jurisdiction and the debtor has
standing to invoke that jurisdiction, the doctrine of sovereign immu-
nity or the Anti-Injunction Act' 99 could prevent the court from en-
joining the collection effort. Section 106 of the Bankruptcy Code
contains a limited waiver of sovereign immunity with respect to
claims against a governmental unit that are property of the bank-
ruptcy estate if the sovereign files a claim arising out of the same
transaction or occurrence. Section 106 also provides that sections
of the Code containing "creditor," "entity," or "governmental
unit" apply to governmental units notwithstanding any assertion of
sovereign immunity.
200
If the bankruptcy court's power to enjoin actions against princi-
pals derives from section 105, then the government can perhaps as-
sert sovereign immunity as a defense. Section 106(c) does not waive
sovereign immunity because section 105 does not contain the words
"creditor," "entity," or "governmental unit." If the stay request
represented a claim that was property of the estate, then the govern-
ment's filing of a tax claim in the bankruptcy case would waive im-
munity with respect to the stay request under section 106(a).
However, the debtor has no legal or equitable interest in the princi-
pal's defense against the government that could be considered
property of the estate. Moreover, when the estate seeks a stay it is
not asserting a claim against the government. Thus, the govern-
ment's sovereign immunity defense has some merit. 20'
(C) a tax required to be collected or withheld and for which the debtor is liable in
whatever capacity." Bankruptcy Code § 507(a)(7)(C) (Supp. III 1985). The Senate Re-
port states that
[t]his category covers the so-called "trust fund" taxes, that is, income
taxes which an employer is required to withhold from the pay of his em-
ployees, the employees' shares of social security and railroad retirement
taxes, and also Federal unemployment insurance. This category also in-
cludes excise taxes which a seller of goods or services is required to col-
lect from a buyer and pay over to a taxing authority.
S. REP. No. 989, supra note 6, at 71, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at
5857.
199 "[N]o suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax
shall be maintained in any court by any person, whether or not such person is the person
against whom such tax was assessed." I.R.C. § 7421(a) (1982).
200 Bankruptcy Code § 106(c)(1) (1982).
201 In any event, if waiver of sovereign immunity with respect to the co-debtor stay
request were based on whether the government filed a tax claim in the bankruptcy, the
government would more likely forego filing a claim and instead proceed directly against




On the other hand, sovereign immunity would not protect the
government from the bankruptcy court's injunctive power with re-
spect to collections from the debtor which would interfere with the
reorganization. Because the basis of enjoining collection from a
principal of the debtor is to protect the debtor's reorganization, the
court should find the same waiver of sovereign immunity notwith-
standing that the debtor's involvement is less direct. 202
The provision of the Internal Revenue Code commonly known
as the Anti-Injunction Act 20 3 presents a more difficult obstacle to a
co-debtor stay against the Internal Revenue Service. That Act pro-
hibits suits to restrain the collection of taxes under the Internal Rev-
enue Code. While several courts have found that the Anti-
Injunction Act bars bankruptcy courts from enjoining tax collec-
tion, 204 the issue is not free from doubt.
Analysis of the effect of the Anti-Injunction Act properly begins
with Bostwick v. United States.205 In Bostwick the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice failed to file proofs of claim in two bankruptcy proceedings. Af-
ter receiving a discharge, the debtors sought a determination from
the bankruptcy court of the dischargeability of certain tax debts, and
an injunction against the collection of back taxes until the court de-
termined their discharge.
The court held that the lhankruptcy court had jurisdiction to de-
termine the dischargeability question and had the power to enjoin
the Internal Revenue Service from collecting the back taxes while
the dischargeability issue was pending. Although the court agreed
with the Internal Revenue Service that the statutory exceptions in
the Anti-Injunction Act did not apply to the bankruptcy cases, it
held that
we do not believe that the 'anti-injunction statute' is relevant to
the present case inasmuch as Congress has evidenced an intention
to enact a complete scheme governing bankruptcy which over-
rides the general policy represented by the 'anti-injunction' act
.... We believe that the overriding policy of the Bankruptcy Act
is the rehabilitation of the debtor and we are convinced that the
Bankruptcy Court must have the power to enjoin the assessment
and/or collection of taxes in order to protect its jurisdiction, ad-
minister the bankrupt's estate in an orderly and efficient manner,
202 See, e.g., In re Campbell Enters., 66 Bankr. 200 (D.N.J. 1986).
203 The Anti-Injunction Act was originally passed as part of the Revenue Act of
1866, ch. 184, § 19, 14 Stat. 78, 152 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a)
(1982)).
204 See, e.g., In re LaSalle Rolling Mills, Inc., 832 F.2d 390 (7th Cir. 1987); A to Z
Welding & Mfg. Co. v. United States, 803 F.2d 932 (8th Cir. 1986) (per curiam).
205 521 F.2d 741 (8th Cir. 1975).
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and fulfill the ultimate policy of the Bankruptcy Act.20 6
Thus, the court found that because a complete statutory scheme
governed discharge and granted the bankruptcy court the power to
issue orders and injunctions necessary to effectuate discharge, the
bankruptcy scheme took precedence over the Anti-Injunction
Act.
20 7
It is worth noting that Bostwick, which relied on the carefully
drawn statutory scheme governing dischargeability, does not di-
rectly apply to a co-debtor stay request in which discharge of the
debtor's liability is not at issue. Nevertheless, when the injunction is
viewed as necessary to support the debtor's reorganization, the
court can reach the same result because a carefully drawn statutory
scheme also governs reorganizations.
In A to Z Welding & Manufacturing Co. v. United States,20 8 however,
the court seemed to reject this parallel by holding that the Anti-
Injunction Act does bar an injunction against collection from re-
sponsible persons in the bankruptcy context. In a short per curiam
opinion, the court limited the effect of Bostwick to Internal Revenue
Service actions against a debtor which is itself in bankruptcy pro-
ceedings, 209 thus seriously eroding the value of Bostwick as support
for the inapplicability of the Anti-Injunction Act.
Yet the A to Z Welding opinion does not analyze the problem nor
does it discuss relevant case authority under the Anti-Injunction
Act. Moreover, the court did not consider the possibility that Con-
gress intended that the bankruptcy court's equitable power under
section 105 should encompass the power to override the Anti-In-
junction Act in order to foster successful reorganizations.
The Third Circuit considered the applicability of the Anti-In-
junction Act to bankruptcy matters in In re Becker's Motor Transporta-
tion, Inc.210 In Becker's Motor a debtor sought to enjoin the collection
of penalties on pre-petition taxes because the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice had not claimed the penalties in the bankruptcy proceeding and
because the underlying taxes had been fully paid in the course of the
Chapter 11 case. The court rejected the Bostwick exception to the
Anti-Injunction Act and held that because bankruptcy court adjudi-
cations are not within the exceptions to that Act, a court cannot cre-
ate such an exception. 211 It noted that Congress had ample
206 Id. at 744.
207 See also In re Campbell Enters., 66 Bankr. 200 (D.NJ. 1986); In reJ.K. Printing
Servs., 49 Bankr. 798 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1985); In reJon Co., 30 Bankr. 831 (D. Colo.
1983).
208 803 F.2d 932 (8th Cir. 1986) (per curiam).
209 Id. at 933.
210 632 F.2d 242 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 916 (1981).
211 Id. at 246.
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opportunities to create a statutory bankruptcy exception and that it
had not done so. Thus, the court found the Anti-Injunction Act
bars an injunction against tax collection in the bankruptcy
context.2
12
The Third Circuit decided Becker's Motor after the passage of the
Bankruptcy Code. Prior to enacting the Bankruptcy Code, the Bost-
wick court had held that the bankruptcy court could enjoin tax col-
lection notwithstanding the Anti-Injunction Act.2 13 Thus, at the
time of passage of the Code, Congress may have omitted any refer-
ence to enjoining tax collection because it believed an injunction
was already permissible. If Congress did not accept the Bostwick ex-
ception to the Anti-Injunction Act, it could have included in the
Code a provision overruling Bostwick.
Congress substantially overhauled the Bankruptcy Code in
1984214 and again in 1986,215 and by the time of these amendments,
both Bostwick and Becker's Motor had been decided. Nevertheless,
Congress again failed to address this issue. The omission in these
amendments of any reference to enjoining tax collections may indi-
cate that Congress was content to let the courts fashion an appropri-
ate exception, or, admittedly, it may simply indicate that Congress
was unaware of the issue or unwilling to resolve it.216
Notwithstanding Becker's Motor and A to Z Welding, powerful sup-
port exists for finding judicial exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act.
In Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co.2 1 7 a taxpayer sought to
enjoin the district director of the Internal Revenue Service from col-
lecting past-due taxes. The Court, recognizing a judicial exception
to the Anti-Injunction Act, observed that the Act would not apply if
the taxpayer (1) was certain to succeed on the merits and (2) could
show that collection would cause him irreparable harm. By recog-
nizing a judicial exception, the Court acknowledged that the Anti-
Injunction Act does not bar all court interference with tax
collection.
212 See also In re LaSalle Rolling Mills, Inc., 832 F.2d 390 (7th Cir. 1987); Bowen
Indus. v. United States, 61 Bankr. 61 (W.D. Tex. 1986); In re Steel Prods., 53 Bankr. 999
(W.D. Wash. 1985); In re Pressimone, 39 Bankr. 240 (N.D.N.Y. 1984).
213 See In re A & B Heating and Air Coniditioning, 48 Bankr. 397 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1985) (congressional silence not persuasive).
214 Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984).
215 Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act
of 1986, Pub. L. No 99-554, 100 Stat. 3088 (1986).
216 Cf In re Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 808 F.2d 363, 369-70 (5th Cir. 1987)
(en banc) (1986 amendments did not represent comprehensive overhaul of bankruptcy
law but instead addressed a few specific problems), aff'd sub nom. United Say. Ass'n v.
Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 108 S. Ct. 626 (1988).
217 370 U.S. 1 (1962).
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In South Carolina v. Regan,2 18 the Court expanded the Williams
Packing exception. In this case the state of South Carolina sought to
enjoin as unconstitutional enforcement of certain provisions of the
Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982.219 These provi-
sions denied tax exempt status to interest earned on obligations is-
sued by states if states issued the obligations in bearer form.
In response to the Internal Revenue Service's argument that
the Anti-Injunction Act barred the suit, the Court carved out an-
other, even broader, judicial exception to the act. It held that the
Act does not apply if there is no alternative remedy for the ag-
grieved party. In Williams Packing, the taxpayer could pay the tax
and then seek a refund from the Internal Revenue Service. In South
Carolina v. Regan, however, the state might issue bonds in bearer
form and induce a taxpayer to pay the tax and seek a refund, but the
state itself would have no means of contesting the statute unless a
court found some exception for the action in the Anti-Injunction
Act.
In the bankruptcy context, if the responsible person was himself
seeking to contest the penalty, then at best the test in Williams Pack-
ing would apply. Because it is unlikely that the responsible person
could show a certainty of success on the merits, he would have to
pay the penalty and then sue for a refund if he believed that he was
not liable.
When the debtor-as opposed to the responsible person-
seeks to enjoin collection, however, the debtor is not claiming that
the tax is not due. Instead, the debtor is claiming that the policies
underlying the Chapter 11 proceeding argue in favor of temporarily
enjoining collection from the responsible person. In other words,
the debtor seeks an injunction to enable the debtor to successfully
reorganize, for the benefit of the creditors generally as well as ulti-
mately for the benefit of the public fisc. In that case, payment of the
penalty and a suit for a refund constitutes an ineffective remedy for
the debtor. The only effective remedy is a temporary injunction.
Thus the action may fit within the South Carolina v. Regan exception
to the Anti-Injunction Act, enabling the bankruptcy court to enjoin
collection. 220
218 465 U.S. 367 (1984).
219 Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324, 596 (1982).
220 This rationale meshes nicely with the preceding discussion of the court's jurisdic-
tion. If the court were deciding the liability of the responsible person, as it seemingly is
under section 505 of the Bankruptcy Code, then the person's remedy would be to pay
the tax and seek a refund. If, as I have argued, the court is exercising its equitable power
under section 105 in order to protect the debtor, then it is the debtor's remedy that is
important. Payment of the penalty and the right to seek a refund is no remedy for the
debtor because the debtor would simply cease doing business absent a stay.
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This analysis, however, was generally considered and rejected
by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in In re LaSalle Rolling Mills,
Inc.2 2 1 In that case, the court held that the Anti-Injunction Act ap-
plies to bankruptcy court attempts to enjoin actions against respon-
sible parties and that co-debtor stay actions do not fall within the
exception created by South Carolina v. Regan. The debtor had argued
that because the tax penalty would be assessed against its principals
rather than against the debtor, the debtor itself would have no effec-
tive alternative remedy other than persuading the principal to raise
defenses. In rejecting this argument, the court found that the alter-
native remedy to which the South Carolina v. Regan court referred was
" 'to contest the legality of a particular tax.' "222 Here, the legality
of the tax penalty was not questioned; the debtor was seeking in-
stead to postpone the assessment for reasons unrelated to whether
the government was entitled to payment under the tax law. 223
In focusing on the legality of the penalty, however, the court
failed to appreciate the harm that the debtor was seeking to avoid.
The facts, which were accepted by the court for purposes of the ap-
peal, indicated that the principals were "indispensable to [the
debtor's] successful reorganization," 224 that the principal's time, en-
ergy, and funds needed for financing the reorganization would be
diverted by the tax proceedings, and that such diversion would
likely cause the reorganization effort to fail.225 Thus, the harm was
not payment of an improperly assessed penalty, but severe and sig-
nificant interference with the bankruptcy proceeding of the debtor.
It was with respect to preventing this interference that the debtor
sought an injunction, and no alternative remedy would prevent this
interference. When viewed from the perspective of the potential
harm to the debtor, the lack of an alternative remedy becomes clear.
Thus, the LaSalle court's focus on the legality of the tax may be
misplaced.
Even if an action by a debtor to enjoin enforcement of the tax
penalty against responsible persons does fit within the South Carolina
v. Regan exception, courts should be wary about granting the relief
sought. At the least, the Anti-Injunction Act represents a statutory
statement expressing the extreme importance of the nonbankruptcy
policy of enforcing tax liability.226 Indeed, the Bankruptcy Code
221 832 F.2d 390 (7th Cir. 1987).
222 Id. at 393 (quoting South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. at 373).
223 Id.
224 Id. at 391.
225 Id at 391-92.
226 See, e.g., BobJones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 736-37 (1974) (suit to enjoin
Internal Revenue Service from revoking private letter ruling that found university quali-
fied for tax-exempt status).
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recognizes the importance of tax collection, and defers to the tax
collector in several important respects. 227 Thus, in balancing the
gains to the bankruptcy system in enjoining the Internal Revenue
Service with the effect on nonbankruptcy policies, the weight of the
nonbankruptcy interests requires that a court find a particularly
strong bankruptcy need before granting an injunction.
Recognizing that a court should not grant any injunction lightly,
some courts have invoked the test for granting a preliminary injunc-
tion. 228 Under that test, as noted above, the court must find that
failing to grant the injunction would irreparably harm the debtor or
its estate, that there is a strong likelihood of success on the merits,
that the party enjoined would suffer minimal harm, and that the in-
junction would not adversely affect the public interest.
The first part of the test requires a determination that collection
from the responsible persons would substantially and adversely af-
fect the reorganization effort. This focuses the inquiry on the effect
on the debtor rather than the effect on the responsible person.
Some courts have interpreted the second part of the test to re-
quire a finding that the responsible person would not be liable to
the IRS if liability were contested.229 This, however, is nonsense.
The problem in these cases is not that the responsible persons are
claiming no liability, but rather that they are trying to delay collec-
tion while the reorganization proceeds, or at least while they de-
velop a reorganization plan for the debtor. Thus, if the test is
whether the responsible persons could legally avoid liability, then
they will always fail. Instead, the court should inquire whether the
debtor can show a likelihood of a successful reorganization.23 0 In
other words, the test of success on the merits is the debtor's success,
not the responsible person's success. After all, it is the debtor, not
the responsible person, that is seeking the relief.
The third part of the test addresses whether the Internal Reve-
nue Service will suffer substantial detriment if a court delays its col-
lection effort. The Internal Revenue Service might suffer
substantial detriment if the delay enables the responsible person to
dissipate his assets or enables other creditors of the responsible per-
son to obtain his assets. However, a court can minimize the detri-
ment if it takes proper steps to protect the interests of the
227 E.g., Bankruptcy Code §§ 507(a)(7) (priority for most taxes), 523(a)(1) (nondis-
chargeability of most tax claims), 1129(a)(9)(C) (Chapter 11 plan must provide for full
payment of priority tax claims), 1322(a)(2) (Chapter 13 plan must provide for full pay-
ment of priority tax claims) (West 1979 & Supp. 1987).
228 See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
229 See, e.g., In re Campbell Enters., 66 Bankr. 200 (D.N.J. 1986); cf. In re LaSalle
Rolling Mills, Inc., 832 F.2d 390, 393 (7th Cir. 1987).




The potential adverse effect on the public interest is the inter-
ference with tax collections that would result from a co-debtor stay.
Again, a court can minimize this adverse effect by limiting the availa-
bility of a stay to only the clearest cases and by providing adequate
protection of the interest of the IRS.
Thus, even if the court has the bare power to enjoin the Inter-
nal Revenue Service from acting against nondebtor principals, it
should exercise the power in only the most extreme cases. Gener-
ally, the government should not have to wait for payment over the
life of a confirmed plan when it could collect more quickly from a
responsible person. Section 6672 of the Internal Revenue Code im-
poses a penalty for failure to aid in the prompt collection of taxes,
and in the normal case a bankruptcy court should not interfere with
that important governmental interest. In the normal case, there-
fore, the responsible person should pay the claim immediately and,
if entitled to it,232 recover indemnity from the estate either in the
context of the reorganization plan or when the stay of actions
against the debtor expires.23 3
Some courts, however, have used their injunction power in
seemingly inappropriate circumstances. For example, in In re Origi-
nal Wild West Foods, Inc. 23 4 the court enjoined the Internal Revenue
Service from foreclosing on the residence of an officer of the debtor
or from otherwise assessing or collecting section 6672 liability from
the officer. The officer had stated that if the court permitted the
foreclosure he would "'throw in the towel'" and end his efforts to
rehabilitate the debtor.23 5 Nothing indicated that the officer of the
debtor was providing financing to the debtor and it was unclear
from the court's opinion that his efforts were even necessary to
the debtor's rehabilitation. In effect, the court simply succumbed to
the officer's threat and on that basis alone enjoined the tax
231 See infra notes 242-44 and accompanying text.
232 Normally the section 6672 penalty is separate from the debtor's tax liability. Be-
cause the responsible person is not a true surety, and technically the IRS could recover
both from the debtor and from the responsible person, without an agreement between
the responsible person and the debtor there may be no right to indemnification for
amounts paid to the IRS. See supra note 190.
233 If the IRS is stayed from enforcing its claim against responsible parties, it will
assert a seventh priority claim against the debtor. Bankruptcy Code § 507(a)(7) (1982).
One commentator has pointed out that if the IRS is permitted to collect from responsi-
ble parties, the estate will benefit because even if the responsible parties are indemnified
by the debtor, Bankruptcy Code section 507(d) denies them subrogation to the seventh
priority to which the IRS is entitled. Thus, denial of a stay and payment by the responsi-
ble parties enables the debtor to, in essence, convert a priority claim to a general claim.
See Note, supra note 195.
234 45 Bankr. 202 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1984).
235 Id. at 205 (quoting testimony given at trial).
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collection.23 6
In fact, there should be little reason to succumb to such threats.
If the reorganization is presently the officer's best employment op-
portunity, then he will continue in his position regardless of
whether the Internal Revenue Service enforces a penalty against
him. Similarly, a decision to seek or accept other employment will
be unaffected by the penalty, which may be imposed regardless of
where the officer is eventually employed. Thus, unless the officer
irrationally intends to disregard his own self-interest in favor of de-
stroying the debtor, courts should treat threats to "throw in the
towel" as nothing more than empty threats.
23 7
Other courts have gone too far in the other direction and re-
fused to recognize the scope of their power when perhaps they
should have applied it. For example, in United States v. Huckabee Auto
Co. 238 the debtor corporation alleged that unless the court enjoined
the IRS from collecting the tax penalty from the corporate princi-
pals, the corporation, pursuant to an indemnity agreement, would
have to divert assets from its reorganization plan to the principals,
and the plan would fail. Without addressing the validity of this as-
sertion, the court rejected the injunction request, finding simply
that the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to enjoin collection
from third parties.2 39 It termed "irrelevant" the fact "that the pen-
alty, if assessed, will adversely affect the corporate debtor's reor-
ganization." 240 Yet, the court reached this conclusion because it
considered only section 505. Had the court also considered section
105, it might have recognized that a temporary injunction, with ap-
propriate protection for the IRS, could accomplish both the goal of
assuring that tax claims are satisfied and protection of the reorgani-
zation effort.
Some courts seem more amenable to granting an injunction
when the debtor's plan provides for full payment of the "trust fund"
taxes and the debtor is current in making its payments. The danger
here is that the court will enjoin collection from the principal be-
cause such collection offends the court's sense of fairness. A court
might reason that if the debtor will eventually pay, the government
236 The court seemingly was influenced by the IRS's earlier representation that it
would not assess the penalty against responsible persons as long as the debtor was
timely in paying under the Chapter 11 plan. Nevertheless, even though the debtor was
timely in paying, the IRS assessed the penalty. There may have been a basis for finding
that the IRS was estopped from assessing the penalty, but that was not the basis of the
court's holding.
237 See Note, supra note 195, at 631.
238 783 F.2d 1546 (11 th Cir. 1986) (per curiam).




does not need to collect from individuals liable only under a penalty
provision. However, if the injunction is to issue under section 105,
its justification must be the substantial need of the debtor, not its
principals. The debtor requests the relief, and the debtor will have
standing to do so only if an action against the principals will sub-
stantially and adversely affect its reorganization effort.
Although there is some basis for finding that courts should es-
top the Internal Revenue Service from collecting from responsible
individuals when the IRS has accepted a confirmed reorganization
plan calling for payment of the tax claim, careful analysis indicates
that a court should not enjoin the action merely because the debtor
has agreed to pay over time unless the IRS has also indicated that it
would not take action against the responsible individuals. 24' The
responsible person's liability is separate from the debtor's. The In-
ternal Revenue Code is carefully crafted to assure that the govern-
ment can collect the trust fund taxes as expeditiously as possible. If
collection from a responsible person will not directly interfere with
the debtor's reorganization, there is simply no basis for the bank-
ruptcy court to interfere with this statutory scheme. The responsi-
ble person has not submitted himself to bankruptcy court
protection, and if the reorganization can proceed notwithstanding
the IRS's action, the government's collection efforts will not impli-
cate the policies of the bankruptcy law.
Even if collection from a responsible person would interfere
with the reorganization, the strong governmental interest in tax col-
lection requires that a court be certain to protect the Internal Reve-
nue Service, lest the responsible persons dissipate their assets and
thereby defeat any future collection effort. For example, in In re
Campbell Enterprises, Inc. 242 the corporate principals sought to enjoin
IRS collection efforts because the imposition of tax liens on their
residences would prevent them from mortgaging the residences to
obtain funds which they would use to provide capital to the corpo-
rate debtor. The interference with the reorganization effort was po-
tentially substantial-additional funds were essential to the success
of the effort. Nevertheless, if the court prevented the IRS from act-
ing against the principals, the principals would mortgage the resi-
dences and thereby put the funds to be contributed to the debtor
beyond the reach of the IRS. If the reorganization were to fail, the
government would be left without protection.
When a court enjoins the IRS from taking action against re-
241 Cf. In re Original Wild West Foods, Inc., 45 Bankr. 202 (Bankr. W.D. Tex.
1984) (U.S. attorney indicated at confirmation hearing no need to pursue personal jeop-
ardy assessments as long as debtor kept payments under confirmed plan current).
242 66 Bankr. 200 (D.NJ. 1986).
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sponsible persons to recover trust fund taxes, the IRS is entitled to
adequate protection of its rights against the responsible persons.
243
Because Congress has repeatedly expressed its view of the impor-
tance of tax collections even in the bankruptcy context, an injunc-
tion against collection from responsible persons should not issue if
it increases the risk that the taxes might remain unpaid. In Campbell,
it appears from the court's discussion that there were no other avail-
able assets that the principals could use to satisfy the tax liability.
Thus, unless the court could find some other means of adequately
protecting the government's interest, the nonbankruptcy interest in
tax collection should have overridden the bankruptcy policy of en-
couraging reorganization. The promise of payments over time in
the context of a reorganization plan is not equivalent to payment
immediately out of tangible assets.
244
D. Suits Against Insurers
Finally, co-debtor stays arise in situations in which a debtor in
bankruptcy has been insured against liability for pre-bankruptcy ac-
tions. Because the insurance policy belongs to the debtor, arguably
it becomes property of the estate and the trustee may assert the
debtor's rights under the policy. 245 Generally those rights will in-
clude indemnification against liability or, more likely, a right to have
the insurance company pay any sums for which the debtor becomes
liable (within the limits of the policy).246 They will often also in-
clude a right to have the insurance company handle any litigation,
including investigation, negotiation, posting of bond, and defense
of the action.2
47
Outside of the bankruptcy context, most states either permit di-
rect actions against insurance companies to recover for the insured's
wrongful conduct or bar insurance companies from avoiding liabil-
ity by conditioning their own liability on prior payment by its in-
243 One type of protection always present is the nondischargeability of section 6672
liability. Bankruptcy Code § 523(a)(1) (1982). See United States v. Sotelo, 436 U.S. 268
(1978). This does not, however, assure that assets available when the injunction was
sought will be available subsequently. Thus, a court should usually require some addi-
tional protection for the IRS.
244 Cf In re Murel Holding Corp., 75 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1935).
245 Bankruptcy Code § 541 (1982).
There may be a distinction between the status of the policy and that of the proceeds
of the policy. In In re Louisiana World Exposition, Inc., 832 F.2d 1391 (5th Cir. 1987),
the court found that insurance policies purchased by the debtor to indemnify officers
and directors were property of the estate but that the proceeds of the policies, which
were payable on behalf of the officers and directors, were not property of the estate.
246 W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW
OF TORTS 585 (5th ed. 1984). Payment differs from indemnification in that a direct pay




sured. 248 This assures that the injured party will collect its
judgment even if the insured has assets insufficient to satisfy the
judgment. In effect, the insurance company becomes the debtor or,
in a sense, holds the funds recoverable under the insurance policy in
a "trust" for the injured party.
249
If the insurance company is viewed as holding funds in trust for
the injured party, then it should remain liable to the injured party
even if the insured is in bankruptcy. No other creditor of the in-
sured debtor has a better right to the funds involved than the in-
jured party, and it is only through the injured party's action that the
funds become available from the insurance company. 250 Moreover,
the purpose of the state laws mandating insurance company liability
is to assure that the injured party can recover from an insured de-
fendant. In most cases there is no reason to permit the bankruptcy
law to override that state policy.
The issues involved when the co-debtor is an insurer, however,
differ from other co-debtor stay issues in two important respects.
First, arguably the insurance policies are property of the estate
under the section 541 definition.251 Assuming that the policies are
property of the estate, no reason exists to resort to section 105 to
find a basis for staying actions against the insurer. Instead, section
362, which automatically stays any acts to obtain property of the es-
tate, would stay an injured party from suing or recovering from the
debtor's insurer.252 Thus, if the policies are within the scope of sec-
tion 541, the section 362 stay automatically applies.
253
248 Id. at 587.
249 Cf 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY (15th ed.), supra note 15, 541.01, at 541-47
(debtor holds insurance proceeds in constructive trust for person to whom bill owed;
therefore, proceeds not property of estate).
250 See, e.g., Wedgeworth v. Fibreboard Corp., 706 F.2d 541, 547 (5th Cir. 1983)
(vacated in part on reh'g, 706 F.2d 541, 548) ("[P]ayments by the insurer cannot inure
to the debtor's pecuniary benefit. . . . A payment by the liability carrier will neither
enhance nor decrease the bankruptcy estate.").
251 See, e.g., In re Davis, 730 F.2d 176 (5th Cir. 1984); In reJohns-Manville Corp., 40
Bankr. 219 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), rev'd in part on other grounds, 41 Bankr. 926 (S.D.N.Y. 1984);
In re Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 54 Bankr. 905 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1985).
252 See, e.g., A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S.
Ct. 251 (1986); In reJohns-Manville Corp., 26 Bankr. 420, 436 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983),
aff'd, 40 Bankr. 219 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd in part on other grounds, 41 Bankr. 926 (S.D.N.Y
1984); In re Davis, 730 F.2d 176 (5th Cir. 1984); Wedgeworth v. Fibreboard Corp., 706
F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1983) (vacated in part on reh'g, 706 F.2d 541, 548); In re Forty-Eight
Insulations, Inc. 54 Bankr. 905 (Bankr. N.D. Il1. 1985).
253 Bankruptcy Code § 362(a)(3) (1982). Although an insurance policy is apparently
property of the estate protected by the automatic stay, this need not inexorably lead to
the conclusion that a direct action against the insurance company is barred. Under
Bankruptcy Code § 541 (1982), only the debtor's legal or equitable interest in property
becomes property of the estate. Thus, section 362 stays the direct action only to the
extent that the direct action affects the debtor's interest. Because the debtor's interest is
in indemnity for losses, in theory a direct action may proceed as long as it will impose no
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Second, because insurance companies are usually solvent and
liquid defendants, issues of protecting a claimant's ability to collect
an eventual judgment need not normally arise. The concern is not
with collection from the co-debtor, but with problems that may arise
in equitably distributing the available insurance proceeds among
claimants.
Most of the insurance cases in recent years have involved mass
tort litigation in which thousands of claimants seek recovery from
the debtor or the debtor's insurer. 254 In that situation, a finding that
the policy is property of the estate and that tort claimants must seek
their recoveries in the context of the bankruptcy proceeding makes
sense. The limits on policy coverage will make it virtually certain
that the funds will not satisfy all claims. The bankruptcy court may
be the best available forum to distribute the insufficient assets equi-
tably. 25 5 Moreover, because there is often litigation between the
debtor and its insurers concerning the scope and coverage of the
policies, determinations in the direct action might estop the debtor
from litigating those issues. 256 Also, the debtor may have an obliga-
tion to aid the defense of the lawsuits, and performance of this obli-
gation could adversely affect the debtor's estate. 257
However, two problems arise if a court considers the insurance
policies as property of the estate. First, as property of the estate the
policy proceeds might then become available to all creditors rather
than to the injured parties. 258 That approach would overturn an im-
liability on the debtor. See, e.g., In re Louisiana World Exposition, Inc., 832 F.2d 1391
(5th Cir. 1987).
254 See, e.g., A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S.
Ct. 251 (1986); In reJohns-Manville Corp., 40 Bankr. 219 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), rev'd in part
on other grounds, 41 Bankr. 926 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Wedgeworth v. Fibreboard Corp., 706
F.2d 541, 548 (5th Cir. 1983) (vacated in part on reh'g, 706 F.2d 541, 548).
255 Cf. Roe, Bankruptcy and Mass Tort, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 846 (1984).
The problem of allocating insufficient insurance proceeds is not limited to mass tort
situations. For example, in Tringali v. Hathaway Mach. Co., 796 F.2d 553 (1st Cir.
1986), two tort claimants sought recovery through an insurance policy with a limit lower
than the aggregate of the claims. The court refused to authorize one of the claimants to
proceed against the insurer because it found that the bankruptcy court was the appropri-
ate forum for determining the proper distribution of the proceeds.
256 A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 251
(1986); In reJohns-Manville Corp., 26 Bankr. 420, 435 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983), af'd, 40
Bankr. 219 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd in part on other grounds, 41 Bankr. 926 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
257 A. H. Robins, 788 F.2d 994; In reJohns-Manville, 26 Bankr. 420. See also In re A.H.
Robins Co., 828 F.2d 1023 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub nom. Oberg v. Aetna Casualty
& Sur. Co., 56 U.S.L.W. 3648 (U.S. Mar. 22, 1988) (No. 87-1208).
258 See supra note 249.
In In re Soliz, 77 Bankr. 93 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987), the court held that a cause of
action against an insurer for breach of a duty to defend was property of the estate, and
that the settlement proceeds were available to all creditors. The court distinguished this




portant nonbankruptcy policy of protecting injured parties but
would yield no corresponding bankruptcy benefit. This approach
would provide a windfall to commercial creditors who would never,
outside of bankruptcy, benefit from the insurance (other than indi-
rectly through the debtor's reduced liability to the tort claimants).
Thus, if courts consider the insurance policies as property of the
estate, then they should earmark them for the injured parties. 259
Second, outside of the mass tort context, staying actions will
unduly delay claimants from recovering their claims without any
bankruptcy benefit from the delay. If the total of the claims involved
falls within the policy limits and the insurance company admits the
validity of the policy, a court has no reason to bar the injured party
from recovering while the bankruptcy case progresses. 260 Tort
cases proceed slowly enough without the added impediment of the
tortfeasor's bankruptcy.
Even when the insurance covers all claims, however, the section
362 automatic stay should apply to direct actions. The stay would
permit the bankruptcy court to make certain that in fact the available
insurance suffices and that the direct action will not otherwise ad-
versely affect the debtor. The injured party must seek relief from the
stay at some cost, and at some delay,261 yet the benefit of bankruptcy
court oversight makes that delay worthwhile. Once the court ascer-
tains the effectiveness and sufficiency of the insurance, however, it
should grant relief from the stay.
Similarly, in ajurisdiction that does not permit a direct action, if
the insurance coverage suffices to satisfy all of the claims against it,
the court normally should be willing to lift the stay of actions against
the debtor. Although the debtor would serve as the nominal defend-
ant in the litigation, the insurance company would, under the terms
of most policies, undertake the defense and obligate itself to satisfy
any recovery. Thus, the only effect on the debtor would be the
drain of resources as a result of its obligation to aid the insurance
company in the defense. For example, employees of the debtor
259 One could argue that a court may reach this result by finding that the debtor has
no legal or equitable interest in the policy proceeds, as opposed to the liability protec-
tion provided by the policy. See, e.g., In re Louisiana World Exposition, Inc., 832 F.2d
1391 (5th Cir. 1987). However, in order to assure an equitable distribution of the pro-
ceeds among appropriate claimants, the court will normally want to assert jurisdiction
over them through section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code. See, e.g., Tringali v. Hathaway
Mach. Co., 796 F.2d 553 (1st Cir. 1986).
260 See, e.g., In re White Motor Credit, 761 F.2d 270 (6th Cir. 1985). See also 2 CoL-
LIER ON BANKRUPTCY (15th ed.), supra note 15, 362.073], at 362-57 (court should nor-
mally permit action against debtor on claim covered by insurance to proceed because
hardship to debtor likely outweighed by hardship to plaintiff).
261 See Bankruptcy Code § 362(e) (1982) (court must consider requests for relief
from stay in expedited fashion).
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might have to aid the insurer in responding to discovery requests or
might have to testify at trial. While this itself could give the court a
basis for continuing the stay in extremely complex litigation such as
the mass tort cases, 262 individual nonmass tort claims do not nor-
mally involve that degree of complexity and may normally proceed
without unduly interfering with the reorganization effort.
Not all insurance runs in favor of injured tort claimants. For
example, a debtor who has borrowed on a secured basis using goods
as collateral would normally be obligated to insure the goods, nam-
ing the secured party as loss payee. If the property suffers injury or
destruction, the secured party may seek to recover directly from the
insurance company.263 Assuming the security interest is valid in
bankruptcy, there is often no reason to deprive the secured party of
its right of action.264 Even here, however, a stay is appropriate to
enable the bankruptcy court to assure that the security interest is
valid in bankruptcy and that the debtor would have no equity in the
262 In re A.H. Robins Co., 828 F.2d 1023 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub nom. Oberg v.
Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 56 U.S.L.W. 3648 (U.S. Mar. 22, 1988) (No. 87-1208); A.H.
Robins Co. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 251 (1986).
263 U.C.C. section 9-306(1) was amended in 1972 to clarify that the proceeds of in-
surance are proceeds of the collateral to which a security interest in the collateral may
attach. U.C.C. § 9-306 official reasons for 1972 change, 3 U.L.A. 440 (1972) ("The new
second sentence of subsection (1) is intended to overrule various cases to the effect that
proceeds of insurance on collateral are not proceeds of the collateral."). See also PPG
Indus. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 531 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1976); In re Mewes, 56 Bankr. 108,
111-12 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1985).
264 Some dispute exists about whether an insurance contract is merely a personal
contract between the insurer and the insured, the proceeds of which become property of
the estate, or whether the contract is for the benefit of the secured party who would have
a greater right to the proceeds. The better view recognizes that a secured party relies on
the availability of insurance proceeds as a substitute for its collateral in the event that the
collateral is damaged or destroyed and that the proceeds of the policy are held in con-
structive trust for the secured party. See, e.g., Paskow v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 579 F.2d
949, 953 (5th Cir. 1978); Ettinger v. Cent. Penn Nat'l Bank, 2 Bankr. 385 (E.D. Pa.
1979), rev'd on other grounds, 634 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1980). See also U.C.C. § 9-306(1)
(1972) (clarifying that insurance proceeds are proceeds of collateral to which security
interest attaches); Henson, Insurance Proceeds as "Proceeds" Under Article 9, 18 CATH. U.L.
REv. 453 (1969). But see Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Prudential Inv. Corp., 222 A.2d
571, 574 (R.I. 1966) ("An insurance contract or policy, so called, pertains to the persons
to the contract and not to the item insured. It is a personal contract which does not
attach to or run with the property insured."). COLLIER ON BANKRUPTcy also adopts the
view that insurance proceeds become part of the estate, but recognizes that the debtor
will often insure the property to protect the creditor:
It is well established that money payable as the proceeds of a fire policy
taken out before bankruptcy for the debtor's benefit does not arise from
property, but from a personal contract between insurer and insured.
Hence, such proceeds will become property of the estate rather than be
awarded to a creditor holding a lien of [sic] the property, unless the
debtor had covenanted to insure for the benefit of the person holding the
lien, or an assignment has been made to the lienor.
4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY (15th ed.), supra note 15, 541.12 (footnotes omitted).
CO-DEBTOR STAYS
insurance proceeds. 265 These will generally be relatively straight-
forward determinations and need not unduly delay the secured
party in seeking its recovery. In addition, however, because the
court may regard the insurance proceeds as property of the estate,
the court may need to decide whether to turn the proceeds over to
the debtor to be used to repair or replace the destroyed collateral or
for the other purposes.
266
As in the co-debtor stay cases involving principals, then, a care-
ful analysis of the bankruptcy policies that litigation against insurers
implicates, and of the nonbankruptcy policies with which a stay in-
terferes, yields results that can reconcile conflicting interests. When
interference with either the reorganization effort or the bankruptcy
policy of equitable asset distribution is substantial, a stay is in order,
provided that it is crafted in a manner that, under the circumstances,
best protects the claimants as well as the debtor. When the litiga-
tion would have little effect on the reorganization effort, recognition
of the nonbankruptcy policies suggests that the litigation be permit-
ted to proceed.
CONCLUSION
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code fosters an atmosphere in
which a debtor with a reasonable chance of successfully reorganiz-
ing can attempt to do so free of unjustified interference. When ac-
tions against co-debtors will interfere with that reorganization
effort, a bankruptcy court may consider whether it should temporar-
ily stay the actions in order to effectuate the bankruptcy policies.
In considering whether to stay actions, however, courts must
recognize the extraordinary nature of such a remedy and use it spar-
ingly. In addition, courts must give full weight to the nonban-
kruptcy policies underlying the action against the co-debtor, and
weigh the benefit to the bankruptcy process against the interference
with the nonbankruptcy policy. Only when there is a clear benefit to
the bankruptcy process, and when that benefit outweighs the inter-
ference with nonbankruptcy interests, should a court consider stay-
ing an action against a party that has not itself chosen to seek
bankruptcy protection.
265 In Bradt v. Woodlawn Auto Workers, 757 F.2d 512, 515-16 (2d Cir. 1985), the
court held that section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code stays a secured party from unilater-
ally seizing the proceeds of an insurance policy. The court found that the proceeds are
property of the estate under Bankruptcy Code section 541 (a) (6). The court noted that
the secured party could seek relief from the stay and was entitled to adequate protection
of its interest in the proceeds.
266 See United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc. 462 U.S. 198 (1983). Of course, if the
security interest extends to the insurance proceeds, the secured party will be entitled to
adequate protection of its interest. Bankruptcy Code §§ 362(d)(1), 363(e) (1982).
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In balancing these interests, a court should consider limiting
the stay and protecting the creditor so as to minimize the harm to
the creditor and, consequently, the interference with nonbankruptcy
policies. If bankruptcy courts recognize and carefully analyze the
issues involved, co-debtor stays may, in appropriate cases, aid the
reorganization effort and ultimately benefit the debtor, the stayed
creditor, and creditors generally, thereby helping to realize the un-
derlying bankruptcy goals of Chapter 11.
